A DEFENSE OF THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION:
REVEALING THE FALLACY THAT FEDERAL PREEMPTION
CONTRIBUTED TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
*

Dori K. Bailey

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1042
I.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION ......................................................... 1043
A. Preemption in the Banking Context ................................1044
B. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson ........ 1049

II. The DODD-FRANK ACT AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION ............ 1053
A. The Preemption Standard ............................................. 1053
1. Interpretation....................................................... 1056
2. Application ......................................................... 1060
B. Standard of Review ......................................................1067
C. Subsidiaries of National Banks ......................................1078
1. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. ......................... 1078
2. Reversal of Watters by the Dodd-Frank Act .............. 1080
3. Elimination of Subsidiary Preemption ..................... 1081
C. Visitation ....................................................................1085
D. Federal Savings Associations ......................................... 1088
III. THE FALLACY THAT FEDERAL PREEMPTION CONTRIBUTED
TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS .................................................... 1093
A. The Federal Regulatory Agencies and the Institutions they
Regulate ..................................................................... 1094
B. Preemption Does Not Apply to State-Regulated Lending
Institutions .................................................................1097

*

Adjunct Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, J.D. Cornell Law School. A
special thanks to Janet Wilmoth, Ph.D., Professor of Sociology, Syracuse University, and
Amy Stein, Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University Law School, for their support.

1041

1042

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:4

IV. BENEFITS VERSUS COSTS OF ELIMINATING FEDERAL
PREEMPTION ........................................................................ 1104
CONCLUSION............................................................................... 1107
INTRODUCTION
At the center of our national culture is the belief that every Amer1
ican should own a home, the so-called “American dream.” Yet, during the recent financial crisis, our nation experienced the worst displacement of Americans out of their homes since the Great
2
Depression. Thus, it is important to objectively understand what
contributed to the crisis and what did not. Some have used the financial crisis to promote changes in the long-standing doctrine of
federal preemption. These proponents have argued that federal
preemption of state laws resulted in the financial crisis and reform
3
legislation was needed. For example, then Governor of New York Eliot Spitzer argued that the federal government used preemption “in
an unprecedented assault on state legislatures, as well as on state at4
torneys general and anyone else on the side of consumers.” According to Mr. Spitzer, the use of preemption made the federal government “a willing accomplice to the lenders” engaged in the predatory
5
lending that ultimately resulted in the subprime mortgage crisis.
Congress responded with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
6
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”). The Dodd-Frank Act
made sweeping reforms to the financial world in an effort “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States” in the wake of the
7
financial crisis. Financial institutions are now subject to a myriad of

1
2

3

4
5
6
7

Anthony DePalma, Why Owning a Home is the American Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1988, at
RP5.
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: CURRENT
CONDITIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 1, 3 (2012) (explaining that, since 2006, “an
unprecedented number of households have lost, or are on the verge of losing, their
homes,” and that the decline in housing prices between 2007 and 2009 was “unprecedented since the Great Depression”).
See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration, Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. 43,549, 43,553 (July 21, 2011) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Implementation] (objecting
to preemption of state and local laws).
Eliot Spitzer, Predatory Lenders’ Partner in Crime, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2008, at A25.
Id.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
Id. pmbl.
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8

new laws. One of the areas of reform concerns federal preemption
9
for national banks and federal thrifts. This Article will examine the
doctrine of federal preemption in the banking realm and whether
federal preemption did, in fact, contribute to the financial crisis.
This Article will first explore the basic framework of the doctrine
of preemption in the context of banking. Part I will begin by discussing the judicial constructs of preemption law in banking, including
an examination of the seminal case of Barnett Bank of Marion County,
10
N.A. v. Nelson. In Part II, this Article will provide a critical examination of how the Dodd-Frank Act maintained some of these judicial
constructs and altered others. While this Article analyzes the impact
of these changes on the doctrine of preemption, the overall effect of
these provisions is yet to be realized.
In Part III, this Article will then examine whether federal preemption contributed to the financial crisis. Those in opposition to federal preemption have argued that federal preemption prevented states
from regulating and enforcing state laws against national banks and
federal thrifts, and this lack of regulation and enforcement resulted
11
in the subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis. Based on
independent data and an analysis of the preemption doctrine, this
Article will argue that federal preemption did not contribute to the
crises.
Finally, in Part IV, this Article will examine the benefits versus the
costs of eliminating federal preemption and requiring national banks
and federal thrifts to comply with the varying laws of fifty states.
Based on this analysis, this Article will argue that the costs of eliminating federal preemption far outweigh the supposed benefits.
I. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The Supremacy Clause provides that federal law “shall be the supreme [l]aw” of the United States, notwithstanding any contrary state

8

9
10
11

See, e.g., id. §§ 601–628, 124 Stat. at 1596–641 (Bank and Savings Association Holding
Company and Depository Institution Regulatory Improvements Act of 2010) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also id. §§ 1400–98, 124 Stat. at 2136–212 (Mortgage
Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 25b, 1465 (2012).
Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
See Joseph R. Mason et al., The Economic Impact of Eliminating Preemption of State Consumer
Protection Laws, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 781, 790 (2010) (“[C]ritics of preemption continue to
push three main arguments, including blaming federal regulation for the subprime crisis,
alleging that federal regulation has been lax, and that preemption threatens the banking
market’s stability.”).
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12

law. Therefore, within constitutional bounds, the federal govern13
ment has the authority and power to preempt state law. The following Subpart will analyze the doctrine of federal preemption in the
context of banking.
A. Preemption in the Banking Context
The doctrine of preemption starts with an initial inquiry: whether
Congress, in promulgating a specific statute, intended the federal law
14
to preempt state law. If a court finds such congressional intent “to
set aside the laws” of a state, then the “Supremacy Clause requires”
the court to uphold the federal law, and the state law will be
15
preempted. In the context of banking, the Supreme Court has held
that national banks “are governed in their daily course of business” by
certain kinds of state law, including laws with respect to contracts,
purchase and sale of property, debt collections, and liability for debts
16
owed by banks. In other matters, the law of preemption generally
follows three basic principles: (i) express preemption, (ii) implied or
17
field preemption, and (iii) conflict preemption.

12

13

14

15
16

17

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 360–61 (1819)
(“The 6th article of the constitution of the United States, declares, that the laws made in
pursuance of it, ‘shall be the supreme law of the land, any thing in the constitution, or laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.’ By this declaration, the States are prohibited from passing any acts which shall be repugnant to a law of the United States.”).
See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
92, 95 (4th ed. 2009) (“Within constitutional limits, Congress has supreme authority . . . .
Congress has very broad authority to regulate national banks, federal savings institutions,
and federal credit unions and to preempt any inconsistent state law.”).
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 30 (“Th[e] question [of preemption] is basically one of congressional intent.”); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) (“In determining whether a state statute is pre-empted by federal law and therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause . . . our sole task is to ascertain the intent of Congress.”); Fid.
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982) (“The pre-emption doctrine, which has its roots in the Supremacy Clause, requires us to examine congressional
intent.” (citation omitted)); Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 491
(5th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “our paramount concern is to effectuate the intent of
Congress” when determining whether a state law is preempted).
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 30.
Nat’l Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869); see also 12 C.F.R.
§§7.4007(c), 7.4008(e) (2014) (providing that state laws with respect to contracts, torts,
criminal law, rights to collect debts, acquisition and transfer of property, taxation, and
zoning “apply to national banks to the extent consistent with the decision of the Supreme
Court in Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson”).
Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 640 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 253 (2011); James, 321 F.3d at 491; Bank of Am. v. City of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 558
(9th Cir. 2002); Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1007 (E.D. Cal.
2002); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000).
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Express preemption can be analyzed in the forms of express statutory preemption, express regulatory preemption, and express
18
nonpreemption. Express statutory preemption occurs when a valid
19
federal statute explicitly states that it preempts state law. In this in20
stance, the courts will follow the express congressional intent. The
particular federal law will govern, and the state law purporting to ap21
ply to the bank will be preempted. A bank subject to the federal law
will need to comply only with the federal law; the state law is not ap22
plicable to the bank.
Express regulatory preemption occurs when a federal regulation
23
explicitly states that it preempts state law. Courts have found that
federal regulations have the same preemptive effect as federal stat24
utes. Moreover, a “pre-emptive regulation’s force does not depend
25
on express congressional authority” to preempt state law. The basic
analysis in this regard is whether the regulatory body was acting within its regulatory authority in promulgating the regulation, and
whether the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of federal law

18
19

20

21

22
23

24

25

See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 94.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2012) (“In order to prevent discrimination against Statechartered insured depository institutions, . . . with respect to interest rates, if the applicable rate prescribed in this section exceeds the rate such State bank . . . would be permitted to charge . . . such State bank . . . may, notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted . . . charge on any loan . . . .”); Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at
31; Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 479 U.S. at 280; de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 152–53; Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530–31 (1977); James, 321 F.3d at 491; Bank of Am., 309
F.3d at 558; Am. Bankers Ass’n, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 30 (explaining that if Congress intended the federal statute to
preempt state law, then “the Supremacy Clause requires courts to follow federal, not state
law”).
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 152–53 (noting that preemption is “compelled” when the congressional intent is “explicitly stated in the statute’s language” (quoting Jones, 430 U.S. at
525)).
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 94.
See de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 147 (explaining that federal thrift associations “shall not be
bound by or subject to any conflicting State law which imposes different . . . due-on-sale
requirements” (quoting 41 Fed. Reg. 18,296, 18,287 (May 3, 1976))). The current federal regulation provides for a “permanent preemption of state prohibitions on the exercise
of due-on-sale clauses” by both federal savings associations and state-chartered thrift institutions. Preemption of State Due-On-Sale Laws, 12 C.F.R. § 591.1 (2002).
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153; Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 145–46 (1982) (finding a state
law invalid under the Supremacy Clause because it conflicts with a valid federal regulation); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 60 (1981) (holding that the “controlling provisions” of the federal regulation “prevail over and displace inconsistent state law”); United
States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381 (1961) (finding a federal regulation “displace[d] inconsistent state law”).
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154.
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26

and not an abuse of regulatory discretion. If a court finds express
regulatory preemption exists, then a bank subject to the federal regulation will need to comply only with the federal regulation; the state
27
law is similarly not applicable to the bank.
Express nonpreemption can occur when the federal statute or
28
regulation explicitly provides that it does not preempt state law. As
a result, both the federal law or regulation (as the case may be) and
29
the state law would be applicable to the bank. As a practical matter,
30
the bank must comply with the stricter of the two. For example, if
the federal law is stricter, then effectively, the bank would have to
31
comply with that law.
If an express statutory or regulatory preemption (or express
nonpreemption) does not exist, then the analysis becomes whether
the federal statute reveals an implicit intent by Congress to preempt
32
state law. Thus, state law can be preempted by implication. Courts
will consider whether the “nonspecific statutory language” or the
“structure and purpose” of the federal statute clearly indicates an im33
plicit intent to preempt state law. For example, the federal law may
34
indicate a clear intent to occupy that entire field of law. This form
26

27
28
29
30
31
32

33
34

Id. at 153–54 (“Where Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discretion,
his judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded
his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily.”); Shimer, 367 U.S. at 383 (“If [the administrator’s] choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were
committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress
would have sanctioned.”); see also Blum, 457 U.S. at 145–46 (“The [federal administrator’s] decision to apply the [federal] regulation . . . is eminently reasonable and deserves
judicial deference.”); Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 57 (finding that there had “been no suggestion
that these regulations are unreasonable, unauthorized, or inconsistent with the [federal
statute]”).
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 94.
Id.
Id.
See id. (“One law is more stringent than another if it prohibits more, requires more, or
allows less.” (emphasis omitted)).
Id.
Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996); see Fid. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152–53 (1983) (“Pre-emption may be either express or implied . . . .”).
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977)); de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 152–53 (quoting Jones, 430 U.S. at 525).
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31; see de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153 (“[A] scheme of federal regulation [created by the federal statute] may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, because the Act of
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject . . . .”
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (internal quotation
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35

of preemption is referred to as field preemption. Prior to the DoddFrank Act, some courts viewed the Home Owners’ Loan Act
(“HOLA”), the federal statute which provides for the chartering and
36
regulation of federal savings associations, as occupying the field with
37
respect to such institutions.
If an express statutory or regulatory preemption does not exist,
and there does not appear to be any implication that the federal law
occupies a particular field of law, then the analysis turns to whether
38
the state statute conflicts with the federal law. This type of preemp39
tion is known as conflict preemption.
Courts may find conflict
preemption when the federal law and the state law are in “irreconcil40
For instance, conflict preemption may be found
able conflict.”
when it would be physically impossible for the bank to comply with
41
both the federal law and the state law. For example, a state law may
provide that all banks in the state must open by 8:00 a.m., and a federal law might provide that national banks may not open until 9:00
a.m. It would be a physical impossibility for a national bank located

35
36
37

38
39
40

41

marks omitted)); Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 491 (5th Cir.
2003).
Bank of Am. v. City of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 2002); Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1007–08 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Nelson, supra note 17, at 227.
12 U.S.C. §§ 1461–1470 (2012).
See Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1974)
(“[F]ederal law preempts the field of prepayments of real estate loans to federally chartered savings and loan associations, so that any California law in the area is inapplicable
to federal savings and loan associations . . . operating within California.”); California v.
Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 318 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (stating that the
Home Owners’ Loan Act “embrace[s] the entire field” and that it is thus “clear that Congress has preempted the field, making invalid the state statutes plaintiffs rely upon . . . when attempted to be invoked against a Federal savings and loan association”); see
also First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Wis. v. Loomis, 97 F.2d 831, 834 (7th Cir. 1938) (affirming the finding of the district court that “the plaintiff is a corporation organized and
existing pursuant to and by virtue of [the Home Owners’ Loan] Act . . . and that as a
Federal savings and loan association it is under the sole authority and control of the laws
of the United States”).
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31; de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153; Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558.
Am. Bankers Ass’n, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 ; Nelson, supra note 17, at 227–28.
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659
(1982)); Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., 321 F.3d at 491; Am. Bankers Ass’n, 239 F. Supp. 2d at
1008.
See Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 (declaring physical impossibility to be an “irreconcilable
conflict”); de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153 (“[S]tate law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when ‘compliance with both ‘federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .’’” (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)); Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558; Am.
Bankers Ass’n, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 (“[A]ctual conflict arises when simultaneous compliance with state and federal law is a physical impossibility . . . .” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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in this state to comply with both the federal law and the state law.
Conflict preemption also may be found when the state law is an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the
42
federal law. This form of conflict preemption is referred to as ob43
stacle preemption. Thus, obstacle preemption can occur when the
state law is inconsistent with the federal law, or the state law interferes
44
with federal policy.
The principles of conflict preemption continue to apply even
45
when the state law is particularly important to the state. For example, in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, despite acknowledging that “real property law is a matter of special concern” to
a state, the Supreme Court held that a federal regulation permitting
federal savings and loan associations to enforce due-on-sale clauses in
46
mortgage loans preempted a conflicting state law. Moreover, as the
Supreme Court indicated in de la Cuesta, a conflict with state law may
be found when a federal law or regulation provides permission to
take certain actions, such as permitting federal savings and loan associations to include and enforce a due-on-sale provision in their mort47
gage agreements, but does not require that those actions be taken.
Similarly, preemption may be found when it is possible for a national
bank to comply with both the federal and the state laws; however, the
state laws “infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue
48
burden on the performance of the banks’ functions.” In addition,
preemption may occur if the state law “frustrates the purpose

42

43
44

45

46
47

48

Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31; de la Cuesta,458 U.S. at 153; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 526 (1977); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y. State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767,
773 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558; Am.
Bankers Ass’n, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1008.
Nelson, supra note 17, at 228–29.
See id. (stating that obstacle preemption may be found both when “state and federal law
contradict each other” and when “the effects of state law will hinder accomplishment of
the purposes behind federal law”); see also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 94 (discussing
the key question of whether “the state law interfere[s] with the policy of the federal law”
(emphasis omitted)).
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153 (“The relative importance to the State of its own law is not
material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law . . . .” (quoting Free v. Bland, 369
U.S. 663, 666 (1962))); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54–55 (1981).
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153, 159.
Id. at 155 (“The conflict does not evaporate because the . . . regulation simply permits,
but does not compel, federal savings and loans to include due-on-sale clauses in their
contracts and to enforce those provisions when the security property is transferred.”).
Ass’n of Banks in Ins. v. Duryee, 270 F.3d 397, 404 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson
Nat’l Bank v. Luckett 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944)).
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of . . . national legislation, or impairs the efficiencies of . . . agencies
49
of the federal government” to carry out their responsibilities.
Moreover, the principles of conflict preemption in banking are
not hindered by a presumption against preemption. The presumption against preemption “rests on the assumption that Congress did
50
not intend to supplant state law.” As the Supreme Court has explained, when Congress legislates in a field which has been “traditionally occupied” by the states, courts “start with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
51
Congress.”
However, a presumption against preemption “is not
triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a
52
history of significant federal presence.” “National banking is the
53
paradigmatic example.” Thus, “because there has been a ‘history of
significant federal presence’ in national banking, the presumption
54
against preemption of state law is inapplicable.”
B. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson
The seminal case in the preemption law of banking is Barnett Bank
of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, in which the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a federal bank statute and a Florida state
55
statute were in “irreconcilable conflict.” The facts and the Supreme
Court’s analysis of the case are worth discussing in detail, especially in
light of the preeminence of this case in subsequent case law and con-

49

50
51
52

53
54

55

Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1008 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting
McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 357 (1896)). See also Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., N.A.
v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 2003); Bank of Am. v. City of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 561
(9th Cir. 2002) (citing First Nat’l Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U.S. 366, 369
(1923)).
Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000); see also Robert S. Peck, A Separation-ofPowers Defense of the “Presumption Against Preemption,” 84 TUL. L. REV. 1185, 1195 (2010)
(“The presumption does not apply where there has been a history of significant federal
presence . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 554 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 559 (quoting Locke, 529 U.S. at 108). See also Wachovia Bank v.
Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The presumption against federal preemption
disappears, however, in fields of federal regulation that have been substantially occupied
by federal authority for an extended period of time. Regulation of federally chartered
banks is one such area.” (quoting Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 183
(2d Cir. 2005)).
Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996).
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56

gressional statutes. The federal statute at issue in the case, 12 U.S.C.
§ 92, granted to national banks the power to sell insurance in small
57
towns, specifically those towns that do not exceed 5,000 people.
The federal statute provided in relevant part that a national bank
located and doing business in any place the population of which does not
exceed five thousand inhabitants . . . may, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the
agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company authorized by the authorities of the State . . . to do business in [that] State, by soliciting and
58
selling insurance . . . .

The Florida statute provided that a bank may sell insurance in these
small towns; however, such a bank may not be a subsidiary of a hold59
60
ing company. Barnett Bank was a subsidiary of a holding company.
The Court acknowledged that the two statutes do not directly conflict, which would be the case if the federal statute required national
banks to sell insurance and the state law prohibited national banks
61
from selling insurance. This hypothetical circumstance would be a
62
case of physical impossibility. Instead, the Court considered whether the state statute, which prohibited a national bank that is a subsidiary of a holding company from selling insurance in these small towns,
“st[ood] as an obstacle to the accomplishment” of one of the purpos63
es of the federal statute. In effect, the Court considered whether
64
conflict preemption applied.
The state of Florida argued that the federal statute is limited to
65
only those circumstances where a contrary state law does not exist.
Thus, the Court considered whether the literal language of the fed56

57
58
59
60
61
62

63
64
65

See 12 U.S.C § 25b(b)(1)(B)–(C) (2012) (citing to Barnett Bank); 15 U.S.C.
§ 6701(d)(2)(A) (2012) (codifying the Supreme Court’s decision in Barnett Bank barring
any state from preventing insurance sales where it is otherwise authorized by federal law);
Ass’n of Banks in Ins. v. Duryee, 270 F.3d 397, 404–05 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Barnett Bank
as the legal standard of preemption).
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 28.
12 U.S.C. § 92 (2012).
Fla. Stat. § 626.988(2) (Supp. 1996).
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 29.
Id. at 31.
See id. (describing the inability to comply with two conflicting statutes as a “physical impossibility”); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul 373 U.S. 132, 142–143 (1963)
(“[F]ederal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce.”).
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
Id.
Id. at 32 (“[T]he State of Florida and its supporting amici argue . . . that the Federal Statute grants national banks a permission that is limited to circumstances where state law is
not to the contrary.”).

Apr. 2014]

DEFENSE OF THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION

1051

eral statute indicated a broad or a limited permission, and found that
66
the plain language of the statute suggested a broad permission. The
statute provided that national banks “may . . . act as the agent” for
67
sales of insurance. Moreover, the federal statute was not qualified
by any reference to state regulation with respect to the licensing of
68
banks as insurance agents. The federal statute expressly provided
that any “rules or regulations” governing a national bank’s sale of in69
surance would be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency.
In fact, the only reference to state regulation was limited to the li70
censing of insurance companies.
Further, the federal statute provided that the grant of authority to
sell insurance is “in addition” to other powers granted to national
71
banks.
The Court explained that grants of “powers” to national
72
73
banks, whether enumerated or incidental, historically have been
interpreted “as grants of authority not normally limited by, but rather
74
ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.” In a case where Con66

67
68

69
70
71
72

73

74

Id. (“[T]he Federal Statute’s language suggests a broad, not a limited, permission. That
language says, without qualification, that national banks ‘may . . . act as the agent’ for insurance sales.” (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 92)).
12 U.S.C. § 92 (emphasis added); Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 32.
See 12 U.S.C. § 92; Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 32 (discussing that 12 U.S.C. § 92 only refers
to state regulation in the context of “licensing—not of banks and insurance agents, but of
the insurance companies whose policies the bank, as insurance agent, will sell”).
12 U.S.C. § 92.
Id.
Id.
Enumerated powers of national banks are those powers expressly granted to national
banks by statute. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012) (granting national banks the power to receive deposits and make loans); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 108 (explaining that a
“bank’s authority depends on the analysis of the statutory text”).
Incidental powers of national banks are those powers that have been interpreted by the
courts or the applicable Federal banking regulator to be incidental to the business of
banking. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012) (granting national banks the power “[t]o exercise . . . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking”); see also NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 259
(1995) (holding that the business of banking is not limited to the enumerated powers set
forth in 12 U.S.C. § 24 and the Comptroller of the Currency has the discretion to authorize activities beyond those powers expressly set forth in the statute); CARNELL ET AL., supra
note 13, at 108–09.
Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996); see also Fid. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170 (1982) (holding that a federal regulation permitting national banks to include a “due on sale” clause in mortgage agreements
preempts a conflicting state statute prohibiting the acceleration of a debt upon sale of the
property); Franklin Nat’l Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375–79
(1954) (holding that a federal statute permitting national banks to accept savings deposits preempts a conflicting state statute prohibiting the use of the word “savings” in the advertising of certain state and national banks); First Nat’l Bank of San Jose v. California,
262 U.S. 366, 368–69 (1923) (finding that national banks’ “power” to receive deposits
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gress has explicitly granted a power to a national bank, the Court reasoned that Congress would not want the states to “forbid, or signifi75
cantly impair,” that power. In contrast, states continued to have the
power to prescribe laws to regulate national banks where those state
laws did not “prevent or significantly interfere” with the exercise by
76
the national bank of the powers granted by federal authority.
The federal statute in this case explicitly granted a national bank
77
the power to sell insurance. The federal statute did not expressly
condition the exercise of that power upon state permission, and thus
the federal statute contained no “indication” that it was Congress’s
78
intent to subject that power to a state restriction.
The Court concluded that the word “may” in the federal statute
should have a broad interpretation that did not condition the federal
79
power upon state permission. Thus, the Court held that the federal
statute granted national banks the power to sell insurance regardless
80
of whether or not a state permitted banks to sell insurance. Under
the “ordinary legal principles of pre[e]mption,” the state statute was
81
preempted.
As further discussed in Part II.A, the Barnett decision continues to
82
be the seminal case in the preemption law of banking.

75
76

77
78
79
80
81

82

preempts contrary state escheat law); Bank of Am. v. City of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 555, 557–
60, 561–64 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the National Bank Act preempts conflicting municipal ordinances prohibiting the charging of ATM fees to non-depositors).
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33; Rose v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 513 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir.
2008); Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 561.
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33; see also Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 247–52
(1944) (holding that a state law requiring surrender of abandoned accounts was not an
“unlawful encroachment on the rights and privileges of national banks”); McClennan v.
Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 358 (1896) (finding that a state statute prohibiting national
banks from taking real estate from insolvent transferees would not “destroy[] or hamper[]” any of the functions of national banks); Nat’l Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 353, 362 (1869) (holding that national banks are not exempt from a state law that
does not “interfere with, or impair the[] efficiency” of a national bank’s performance of
its functions); Bank of Am. v. City of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 558–59 (9th Cir. 2002) (“State
regulation of banking is permissible when it does not prevent or significantly interfere
with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 34.
Id. at 34–35 (citing Franklin Nat’l Bank, 347 U.S. at 378).
Id. at 35 (citing Franklin Nat’l Bank, 347 U.S. at 343).
Id. at 37.
Id. at 28, 37–38 (holding that the ordinary rules of preemption, rather than the special
McCarran-Ferguson anti-preemption rule, apply where the federal statute “specifically relates to the business of insurance”).
Id. at 25; see infra Part II.A.
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II. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress addressed the doctrine of federal preemption in the banking realm. This Part will first discuss the
preemption standard provided in the statute.
A. The Preemption Standard
In the spirit of reform premised by the statute, the Dodd-Frank
Act specifically addresses preemption with regard to State consumer
83
financial laws. A “State consumer financial law” is a state law “that
does not directly or indirectly discriminate against national banks and
that directly and specifically regulates the manner, content, or terms
and conditions of any financial transaction . . . with respect to a con84
sumer.” The Act’s preemption standard provides that a State consumer financial law will be preempted only if one of the following
three circumstances apply: (i) the “application of a State consumer
financial law would have a discriminatory effect on national banks” as
85
compared to the effect of the law on state-chartered banks, (ii) the
State consumer financial law “prevents or significantly interferes”
with the national bank’s exercise of its powers “in accordance with
86
the legal standard for preemption” in the Barnett decision, or (iii)
the State consumer financial law is preempted by another federal
87
law. Notably, with respect to national banks, the Dodd-Frank Act
does not address preemption of state laws that do not meet the crite88
ria of a “State consumer financial law.” Thus, existing preemption
standards would still apply to national banks with respect to those
state laws. Further, the Dodd-Frank Act expressly provides that the
National Bank Act “does not occupy the field in any area of [s]tate
89
law.”
In considering the preemption standard, it is evident Congress
was concerned with discrimination against national banks. As an initial matter, a state law will not fall within the scope of a “State consumer financial law” if it directly or indirectly discriminates against
83
84
85
86
87
88

89

See 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2012) (clarifying state law preemption standards for national banks
and subsidiaries).
Id. § 25b(a)(2) .
Id. § 25b(b)(1)(A) .
Id. § 25b(b)(1)(B) .
Id. § 25b(b)(1)(C) .
Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,551 n.11; see id. at 43,556 n.47
(“[N]othing in Dodd-Frank affects the [Comptroller’s] authority to address preemption
questions concerning laws other than ‘state consumer financial laws.’”).
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(4).
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90

national banks. A state law that directly discriminates against national banks presumably would permit less or require more of a national bank than a state-chartered bank. For example, if a state law
required national banks to provide drive-up window service while
state-chartered banks were not held to the same requirement, then
the state law would directly discriminate against national banks. Similarly, if a state law required national banks to be closed on Saturdays
but state-chartered banks were permitted to be open on Saturdays,
then the state law would directly discriminate against national banks.
A state law that indirectly discriminates against national banks is
somewhat less obvious; however, one can imagine a circumstance in
which the state law required borrowers of national banks to pay a two
percent mortgage recordation tax while borrowers of state-chartered
banks paid a mortgage recordation tax of only one percent of the
loan amount. In this example, the fee is paid by the borrower; thus,
the state law indirectly discriminates against national banks by requiring borrowers of national banks to pay higher fees than borrowers of
state banks.
If a state law “does not directly or indirectly discriminate against
national banks” and “directly and specifically regulates the manner,
content, or terms and conditions of any financial transaction” with a
consumer, then the state law will be considered a “State consumer fi91
nancial law” under the statute. The analysis then turns to whether
the state law may be preempted pursuant to one of the three prongs
of the preemption standard.
The first prong of the preemption standard, which may be aptly
called “discriminatory effect preemption,” is a new standard for find92
ing preemption of a State consumer financial law. This prong provides that a State consumer financial law may be preempted, even if it
90
91
92

Id. § 25b(a)(2) .
Id.
Interpretive Letter No. 1132 from John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Thomas R. Carper, at 2 & n.5 (May 12,
2011). While discriminatory effect preemption is a new standard in the preemption of
State consumer financial laws, the concern of a possible discriminatory effect against national banks has a long history in the usury laws of banking. See, e.g., Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank
of Mo., 85 U.S. 409, 413 (1873) (expressing a concern with “expos[ing] [national banks]
to the hazard of unfriendly legislation by the States,” and thus holding that national
banks may charge interest at the same rate as that permitted to be charged by statechartered banks, but if a higher rate is permitted to be charged by other lenders in the
state, national banks may charge that higher rate); cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2012) (permitting insured state-chartered banks to charge the highest rate of interest permitted by
lenders in the state as a means of avoiding discrimination against insured banks in general).
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does not directly or indirectly discriminate against national banks but
rather, if it has a “discriminatory effect on national banks” as com93
pared to the effect on state-chartered banks. One may look to the
94
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) to discern the meaning of
discriminatory effect within banking law. The ECOA prohibits discrimination against credit applicants on the basis, inter alia, of age,
95
gender, marital status, race, color, religion, or national origin. The
Federal Reserve Board adopted an “effects test” in interpreting the
96
ECOA. The ECOA may prohibit a particular practice by a creditor
that has a “disproportionately negative impact” or effect on one of
97
the protected classes. This may be the case even if the creditor had
“no intent to discriminate” and the practice itself appears to be “neu98
tral on its face.”
As applied to the discriminatory effect preemption prong, a State
consumer financial law may be deemed to have a discriminatory effect on national banks as compared to the effect on state banks if, for
example, the law provides that all businesses located in the state must
pay a fee to the state to obtain a license to operate. Under this law,
state banks would be required to pay the single fee to the state to obtain a license while national banks would be required to pay the fee
for a state license plus the fee to the Comptroller of the Currency to
99
obtain a charter to operate as a national bank. Thus, this state law,
while appearing neutral on its face, would have a disproportionately
negative impact or effect on national banks as compared to state
banks.
The second prong, generally referred to as “Barnett standard
100
preemption,” has been a source of debate regarding whether the
prong preserves and codifies the Barnett precedent of conflict
101
preemption or creates a new preemption standard. This debate will
be further discussed in Part II.A.1. The third prong simply acknowl-

93
94
95
96
97

98
99
100
101

12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691(a)–(f) (2012)).
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1).
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 354; see 12 C.F.R. § 202.6 (2013).
12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a)(2). An exception exists if the “practice meets a legitimate business
need” of the creditor that cannot reasonably be accomplished as well in a way that is less
unequal in its effect. Id.
Id.
See infra note 411 and accompanying text.
Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 2–4.
See Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
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edges preemption of State consumer financial laws by other federal
102
laws.
The Dodd-Frank Act also provides new procedures the Comptrol103
ler must follow under the Barnett standard preemption prong. Any
preemption determination under this prong may be made either “by
a court, or by regulation or order of the Comptroller of the Currency
104
on a case-by-case basis.”
In each instance, the Comptroller must
make a determination about the impact the “particular State consumer financial law” has on national banks that are subject to either
the particular state law or, more broadly, the law of another state with
105
“substantively equivalent terms.”
The Comptroller must consult
with the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (“BCFP”) in determining that another state’s law is “substantively equivalent” to the
106
state law at issue.
This language was intended to allow the Comptroller “to make a single determination” regarding the consumer financial laws of multiple states provided each law includes “substan107
tively equivalent terms.”
Moreover, the Comptroller may not
preempt a State consumer financial law “unless substantial evidence,
made on the record of the proceeding, supports the specific finding
[of preemption] . . . in accordance with the legal standard” of the
108
Barnett decision. The Comptroller is further required to conduct a
periodic review every five years after making a preemption determi109
nation with respect to a State consumer financial law. The Comp110
troller’s review is subject to notice and public comment.
The following Subparts examine the debate regarding the interpretation of the Barnett preemption standard and illustrate how the
standard will be applied by the Comptroller and the courts.
1. Interpretation
The Barnett standard preemption prong provides that a State consumer financial law may be preempted if it “prevents or significantly
interferes” with the national bank’s exercise of its powers “in accord102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(C) (2012) (“[T]he State consumer financial law is preempted by a
provision of Federal law other than title 62 of the Revised Statutes.”).
Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,551 n.11.
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B).
Id. § 25b(b)(3)(A) .
Id. § 25b(b)(3)(B).
Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 4 & n.17 (citing S. REP. NO. 11-176, at 176
(2010)).
12 U.S.C. § 25b(c).
Id. § 25b(d)(1).
Id.
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ance with the legal standard for preemption” in the Barnett deci111
sion. Two competing theories have been proffered regarding how
this prong should be interpreted.
In a May 12, 2011 letter to Senator Thomas Carper, who along
with Senator Mark Warner authored the final version of the preemption provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Acting Comptroller of the
Currency, John Walsh, discussed his interpretation of the Barnett
112
standard preemption prong.
According to Walsh, the use of the
phrase “in accordance with the legal standard for preemption” in the
Barnett decision should be interpreted as Congress’s intention that
the Comptroller use the standard for conflict preemption discussed
113
in Barnett. Walsh acknowledged that the statute includes the phrase
“prevent[s] or significantly interfere[s]” from the Barnett case and,
therefore, the conflict preemption analysis will start with this formu114
lation. However, Walsh argued that the statute requires that phrase
to be analyzed “in accordance with the legal standard for preemption” in the Barnett decision; thus, the Comptroller’s analysis will incorporate the Supreme Court’s entire analysis of conflict preemption
115
in Barnett rather than just the single phrase.
This analysis appears to be sound. In examining the plain language of the statute, if Congress intended to narrow the preemption
standard to a “prevents or significantly interferes” standard, then the
qualifying phrase, “in accordance with the legal standard for preemp116
tion” in the Barnett case, would be unnecessary. Alternatively, if
Congress intended the “prevents or significantly interferes” language
to be the new standard for preemption, then the qualifying phrase
might simply state “in accordance with” the Barnett case. However,
the qualifying phrase refers to the “legal standard for preemption” in
117
the Barnett decision. Thus, Congress appears to have contemplated
a “legal standard for preemption” broader than the “prevents or significantly interferes” language.
This interpretation is reinforced by the “substantial evidence” requirement of the statute, in which a finding of preemption must be

111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id. § 25b(b)(1)(B).
Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 1.
Id. at 2 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B)) (citing Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31–32 (1996)).
Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. §25b(b)(1)(B)) (citing Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33).
Id. at 2–3 & n.13 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B)) (citing Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33–
34).
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B).
Id.
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“in accordance with the legal standard” of the Barnett decision.
This interpretation is further supported by statutory and judicial
119
precedent. The language of the Barnett standard preemption provision in the Dodd-Frank Act is effectively the same language Congress
used in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 when setting forth
120
preemption standards for the sale of insurance by national banks.
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit in Ass’n of Banks in Insurance v. Duryee,
applied the same Barnett “legal standards for preemption” provision
in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to preempt certain state licensing laws
that prohibited national banks from acting as insurance agents in
121
small towns with a population of 5,000 or less. The Sixth Circuit’s
analysis makes clear that the “Barnett Bank standard” of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act refers to the entire analysis of the Supreme Court in
122
the Barnett decision.
Further, Senator Carper released a statement indicating that the
Comptroller’s view of the Barnett standard preemption provisions of
the Dodd-Frank Act is consistent with his intent and the legislative
123
language.
Senator Carper highlighted that the Barnett standard
preemption provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act “do not create a brand
new preemption standard, but instead clarify that the traditional
preemption tests, as laid out by the Supreme Court in the Barnett
124
case, continue to apply.”
However, the Department of the Treasury took a different view.
In a June 27, 2011 letter to Acting Comptroller Walsh, General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury George W. Madison argued

118
119

120

121
122

123
124

Id. § 25b(c); see also Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 3 & n.13 (explaining
the “substantial evidence” requirement of the statute).
15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A) (2012); Ass’n of Banks in Ins. v. Duryee, 270 F.3d 397, 404–05,
408–10 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing the Barnett Bank decision as the standard for findings of
preemption); see also Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 3.
15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A) (“In accordance with the legal standards for preemption set
forth in the [Barnett Bank decision], no State may . . . prevent or significantly interfere
with the ability of a depository institution . . . to engage . . . in any insurance sales, solicitation, or crossmarketing activity.”); see also Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 3;
Letter from Sen. Thomas R. Carper & Sen. Mark R. Warner to Timothy Geithner, Sec’y of
the Treasury, at 2 (July 8, 2011) (noting the similarities in the language between the
Dodd-Frank Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
Ass’n of Banks in Ins., 270 F.3d at 400–01, 404–05, 408–10; see also Interpretive Letter No.
1132, supra note 92, at 3.
Ass’n of Bank in Ins., 270 F.3d at 404–05, 408 (discussing in detail the Court’s entire analysis in the Barnett Bank decision and finding preemption under the “traditional Barnett
Bank standards”); see also Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 3.
OCC Letter Sketches Implementation Plan For Preemption Regime Under Dodd-Frank,
BANKINGDAILY (May 13, 2011), https://newsletters.aba.com/bcnl/20110527.
Id. (quoting May 13, 2011 statement of Sen. Carper).
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that the “plain language of the statute” provides that a State consumer financial law may be preempted if the law “prevents or significantly
125
interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers.”
Therefore, according to the Treasury, Congress intended the “relevant test” to be the more narrow “prevents or significantly interferes”
standard in the Barnett decision and not the broader interpretation of
126
the “entirety of the Barnett opinion” advocated by the Comptroller.
In pointed response, Senator Carper and Senator Warner authored a joint correspondence to the Secretary of the Treasury Timo127
thy Geithner reiterating that the “Barnett standard was maintained.”
Senators Carper and Warner explained that the “prevents or significantly interferes” language “is not a limiting phrase” but rather is
128
“stating the touchstone of the Barnett case.”
Further, the Senators
emphasized that a finding by the Comptroller to preempt a State
consumer financial law will be upheld by a court only if the determination is “in accordance with the legal standard” of the Barnett deci129
sion. Therefore, the Dodd-Frank Act “explicitly order[s]” a court to
review the Comptroller’s preemption finding “based on the legal
130
standard of Barnett, not some part of it.” As the Senators stated, it
would be an “absurdity” if Congress were instructing courts to use a
standard of review that is broader than the standard used by the
131
Comptroller of the Currency.
In the final rule implementing the preemption provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act, the Comptroller further explained that the statute’s
reference to the “legal standard for preemption” in the Barnett decision is a reference to “conflict preemption, applied in the context of
132
The Doddpowers granted national banks under Federal law.”
Frank Act was not intended to establish, nor does it establish, a new
133
“prevents or significantly interferes” standard for preemption. The
“prevents or significantly interferes” language in the statute is simply
a reference to “part of” the Supreme Court’s “discussion of its reasoning” in the Barnett decision and was not intended to be construed as

125

126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Comment Letter from George W. Madison, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of the Treasury, to
John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, at 1–2 (June 27, 2011), available at http:
//cdn.americanbanker.com/media/pdfs/TreasuryOCC_062811.pdf.
Id. at 2.
Letter from Carper & Warner, supra note 120, at 1 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 2 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 25b(c) (2012)).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,555.
Id.
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the “legal standard for preemption” in the decision. Thus, the statute “incorporates the conflict preemption legal standard and the rea135
soning that supports it in the Supreme Court’s Barnett decision.”
In sum, Congress’s intent clearly was to maintain and codify the
136
Barnett preemption standard.
This “standard is conflict preemp137
This
tion, as supported by the reasoning” of the Barnett decision.
reasoning includes the “prevents or significantly interferes” formula138
tion, “but is not bounded by” it. Thus, the standard is broader than
the “prevents or significantly interferes” language and incorporates
139
the entirety of the Barnett preemption analysis.
The Comptroller
will, therefore, consider the Supreme Court’s entire analysis of conflict preemption in the Barnett decision when determining whether to
140
preempt a State consumer financial law.
This crucial clarification
in the interpretation of the preemption standard is exceedingly important in the doctrine of preemption for national banks. If Congress had not intended to preserve the conflict preemption analysis
in the Barnett decision, but instead sought to create a new, narrower
“prevents or significantly interferes” standard, then “it would have
been rejecting not just Barnett, but also . . . well over a century of judi141
cial precedent upon which the decision was founded.”
2. Application
Based on this interpretation of the Barnett standard preemption
prong, exactly what factors will guide the Comptroller in determining
whether a State consumer financial law is preempted? According to
the Comptroller, the “essence” of the analysis under the Barnett conflict preemption standard is an “evaluation of the extent and nature”
of any “impediment” a state law imposes on the “exercise of a power

134
135
136

137
138
139
140
141

Id.
Id.
Letter from Carper & Warner, supra note 120, at 1 (“[T]he statute is intended to codify
the Barnett case.”); Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 1–2 (citing 156 CONG.
REC. S5902 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (colloquy between Sen. Carper and Chairman Dodd)
(“There should be no doubt that the legislation codifies the preemption standard stated
by the U.S. Supreme Court in [Barnett Bank].”)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 875
(2010) (Conf. Rep.) (“The conference report [accompanying the Dodd-Frank Act] codifies the standard in . . . Barnett Bank . . . .”).
Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,555.
Id.
Letter from Carper & Warner, supra note 120, at 1–2.
Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 2–3 & n.13.
Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,555.
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142

granted national banks under Federal law.”
The “conflict” the
Comptroller analyzes under the conflict preemption standard is the
143
“nature and scope of that impediment.” Moreover, the “prevents or
significantly interferes” formulation is the “touchstone” of the Barnett
144
standard for conflict preemption and the related analysis.
For example, in Barnett, the state statute restricting the ability of a national
bank to sell insurance in small towns imposed an “impediment” on
145
the “exercise of a power granted national banks under Federal law.”
Based on the Supreme Court’s analysis, the “nature and scope” of
that impediment significantly interfered with the ability of a national
bank to exercise its power granted under federal law to sell insurance
146
147
in small towns. Thus, the state statute was preempted.
Similarly, under the Barnett standard, state laws that require national banks to make certain disclosures or refrain from using certain
terms in advertising with respect to taking deposits or making loans
would “present a significant interference” with the exercise of powers
148
granted national banks under federal law. For instance, in Franklin
National Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, the Supreme Court found
a “clear conflict” between a federal statute that permitted national
banks to accept savings deposits and a state statute that prohibited
the use of the word “savings” in the advertising of certain state and
149
national banks. The Court found “no indication that Congress in150
tended to make this phase of national banking subject to” state law.
151
Franklin National Bank was
Thus, the state statute was preempted.
142

143
144

145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,556. It should be noted that while the
preemption analysis in the Barnett decision could be applied to any type of state law, the
scope of the Barnett standard preemption provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act is limited to
the determination of whether a state consumer financial law is applicable to national
banks. Id. at 43,556 n.47.
Id. at 43,556.
Id. at 43,555; Letter from Carper & Warner, supra note 120, at 1; see also Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 2 (explaining that the preemption provision includes the
phrase “prevents or significantly interferes” from the Barnett case and, therefore, the conflict preemption analysis will start with this formulation).
Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1996); Dodd-Frank
Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,556.
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 32–33; Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,556.
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 28, 37–43.
Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,557.
Franklin Nat’l Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 374, 378 (1954).
Id. at 378.
Id. at 374; see also Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 704 F.3d 712, 726 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“The requirement to make particular disclosures falls squarely within the purview of federal banking regulation and is expressly preempted . . . .”); Rose v. Chase Bank USA,
N.A., 513 F.3d 1032, 1036–38 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the National Bank Act
preempted a state law requiring certain disclosures on convenience checks issued by na-
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expressly discussed in the Barnett opinion and is one of the many cas152
es upon which the Barnett decision relied.
Moreover, state laws that impose an impediment on a fundamental or core banking business would significantly interfere with the
153
ability of a national bank to manage that business.
For example,
state laws that would impact the ability of a national bank to “underwrite and mitigate credit risk, manage credit risk exposures, and
manage loan-related assets” would “meaningfully interfere” with the
“fundamental” banking business of making loans and managing the
154
associated credit risks. Similarly, state laws that would impose or alter standards with respect to the depository activities of a national
bank, such as standards affecting the types and terms of deposit accounts or the availability of funds, would “significantly interfere” with
155
the management of a “core” business of national banks. State laws
directed at the depository activities of a national bank are significant
because such laws affect the “overall risk management and funding
strategies” of a bank, “including liquidity, interest rate risk exposure,
156
funding management, and fraud prevention.”
Judicial interpretation of the preemption provisions of the DoddFrank Act provides further enlightenment. For example, in Baptista
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal of a class action suit against JPMorgan Chase for charging a
157
check cashing service fee to a non-account holder.
The plaintiff-

152

153
154

155
156
157

tional banks); Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp.2d 1000, 1014–18 (E.D. Cal.
2002) (finding preemption of a state law that required mandatory disclosures on credit
card bills because the “monetary and non-monetary costs” of the disclosures “constitute[d] a significant interference” with the powers granted to national banks under the
National Bank Act).
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33–35 (“In defining the pre-emptive scope of statutes and regulations granting a power to national banks, [prior] cases take the view that normally Congress would not want States to forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power
that Congress explicitly granted. . . . Thus, the Court’s discussion in Franklin Nat. Bank
[sic], the holding of that case, and the other precedent . . . strongly argue for [an interpretation of the federal statute] that does not condition federal permission upon that of
the State.”).
Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,557.
Id. (explaining that, for example, state laws affecting “the protection of collateral value,
credit enhancements, risk mitigation, loan-to-value standards, loan amortization and repayment requirements . . . when a loan may be called due and payable, escrow standards,
use of credit reports to assess creditworthiness of borrowers, and origination, managing,
and purchasing and selling extensions of credit” would meaningfully interfere with a national bank’s fundamental business of making loans and managing the associated risks).
Id.
Id.
Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 640 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 253 (2011).
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appellant alleged the service fee violated a Florida statute that “prohibit[ed] a bank from ‘settl[ing] any check drawn on it otherwise
158
than at par.’” In considering the question of what type of preemption would be applicable (i.e., express preemption, field preemption,
or conflict preemption), the Eleventh Circuit underscored that the
Dodd-Frank Act amended the preemption section of the National
159
Bank Act “to address this very issue.”
Upon review of the Barnett
preemption standard in the statute, as well as the Barnett case itself,
the court found that “under the Dodd-Frank Act, the proper preemption test asks whether there is a significant conflict between the state
160
and federal statutes—that is, the test for conflict preemption.” Ap161
plying this test, the court found a “clear conflict” to exist. The state
statute which prohibited the charging of fees to non-account holders
was in “substantial conflict with federal authorization,” which permit162
ted such fees to be charged.
Thus, the state statute was preempt163
ed.
A number of points may be drawn from the Baptista case. In its
analysis, the Eleventh Circuit observed that the Supreme Court in
Barnett found that the “controlling question” was whether the state
law “forbid[s], or . . . impair[s] significantly, the exercise of a power
164
that Congress explicitly granted.” The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the “proper preemption test” under the Dodd-Frank Act is “the
165
test for conflict preemption.” This analysis was directly in line with
that of the Comptroller and with the intent of Congress. The “prevents or significantly interferes” formulation or even the “forbid[s],
or . . . impair[s] significantly” formulation is the “touchstone” of the
166
preemption analysis.
However, the analysis does not end with either of these formulations. As the Eleventh Circuit and the Comp158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 655.85 (2011)).
Id. at 1197.
Id.
Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1197 (quoting Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33
(1996)).
Id.
See Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,555 (noting that the “prevents or significantly interferes” formulation is the “touchstone” of the Barnett standard for conflict
preemption and the related analysis); Letter from Carper and Warner, supra note 120, at
1 (explaining that the “prevents or significantly interferes” language “is not a limiting
phrase” but rather “stat[es] the touchstone of the Barnett case”); see also Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 2 (explaining that the provision includes the phrase “prevents or significantly interferes” from the Barnett case and, therefore, the conflict preemption analysis will start with this formulation).
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troller pointed out, the preemption standard under the Dodd-Frank
Act is the broader test of “conflict preemption” based on the entirety
167
of the analysis in the Supreme Court’s Barnett decision.
Further, as discussed previously in Part I.A, the principles of conflict preemption continue to apply even when the state law is particu168
larly important to the state. The state law in Baptista “[did] not directly or indirectly discriminate against national banks
and . . . directly and specifically regulate[d] the manner, content, or
terms and conditions of [a] financial transaction . . . with respect to a
169
consumer.” Thus, the state law at issue in Baptista was a State con170
sumer financial law under the meaning of the Dodd-Frank Act.
While State consumer financial laws are, without question, of particular importance to the state, it is evident that even after the financial
171
crisis, during which many consumers suffered financial harm,
courts will continue to honor the principles of conflict preemption as
indicated by the decision in Baptista to preempt a State consumer fi172
nancial law.
Moreover, not only was the state statute in Baptista a State consumer financial law, but, in particular, it was a law that protected individuals who did not have a bank account in which to deposit a
check and, therefore, would need to cash the check with the bank
173
upon which the check was drawn. Such individuals are most likely
of limited financial means and lack the wherewithal to open and
maintain the minimum balances necessary for a modern bank ac174
count. These are exactly the type of individuals the Dodd-Frank Act
167

168
169
170
171

172
173

174

Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1197; Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,555 (“Th[e]
standard is conflict preemption, as supported by the reasoning of the [Barnett] decision.”).
See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
12 U.S.C. § 25b(a)(2) (2012); Baptista 640 F.3d at 1196 (11th Cir. 2011).
12 U.S.C. § 25b(a)(2); Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1196–97.
156 CONG. REC. S5888 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Johnson) (explaining
that, as a result of the financial crisis, “Americans . . . were losing their homes, jobs, and
long-term savings”).
See Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1196–98.
Baptista did not have a checking account with Chase. It may be presumed that Baptista
also did not have a checking account with any other bank and, therefore, needed to cash
the check with the bank upon which it was drawn. See id. at 1196. See also Wells Fargo
Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 2003) (describing a similar statute
that was enacted in Texas “as a consumer protection measure . . . to ensure that Texas
employees, and in particular the working poor, receive payment for the face value of
their paycheck.”).
See James, 321 F.3d at 490 (“[I]ndividuals who do not have a checking account and who
seek to cash checks at the institution which issued the [check] are predominantly lowincome individuals . . . .”); 156 CONG. REC. S5871 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Akaka) (“Regular checking accounts may be too expensive for some consumers un-
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175

ostensibly intended to protect. One of the primary purposes of the
statute was “to protect consumers from abusive financial services
176
Yet, the Dodd-Frank Act directs courts to precisely the
practices.”
conflict preemption analysis undertaken in Baptista, which resulted in
the preemption of a State consumer financial law that otherwise
would have prevented a bank from charging a consumer a $6.00 fee
177
to cash a $262.48 check. While some may find this to be an untenable result, it is the correct result for two reasons.
First, preemption is the correct result under the Baptista court’s
178
preemption analysis.
Specifically, the National Bank Act permits
banks to “exercise . . . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary
to carry on the business of banking[] by discounting and negotiating
promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of
179
debt.” In addition, the Comptroller promulgated a regulation pursuant to the National Bank Act that permits a national bank to
“charge its customers non-interest charges and fees, including deposit
180
account service charges.”
The Comptroller’s interpretation of the
term “customer” included “any person who presents a check for pay181
ment.”
The Eleventh Circuit found that the Comptroller was au182
Furthorized to “regulate banking and banking-related activities.”
ther, the Comptroller’s interpretation of the term “customer” to be
“any person presenting a check for payment” was “not unreasona183
ble.”
The court noted that the significant objective of the Comptroller’s regulation was to permit national banks not only to charge
such fees but also to provide national banks with the “option of how
184
to charge” the fees. The Eleventh Circuit found that the state law

175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184

able to maintain minimum balances or afford monthly fees.”). For example, the Chase
Total Checking account requires the account holder to pay a “$12 [m]onthly [s]ervice
[f]ee” or, to avoid the monthly fee, the account holder must (i) make “monthly direct
deposits totaling $500 or more,” (ii) maintain a “$1,500 minimum daily balance,” or (iii)
maintain an “average daily balance of $5,000 or more” combined with another account.
Chase Total Checking, CHASE, https://www.chase.com/checking/total-checking (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
See generally 156 CONG. REC. S5870 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (explaining that one of the
purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act is “to protect consumers”).
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, pmbl., 124 Stat. 1376.
Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1196–98.
Id.
Id. at 1196 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24).
Id. at 1196–97 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(a) (2001)).
Id. at 1197 (quoting James, 321 F.3d at 490 & n.2).
Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id. at 1198 n.2 (“[T]he establishment of non-interest charges and fees, their amounts,
and the method of calculating them are business decisions to be made by each bank, in
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“reduce[d] the bank’s fee options by [fifty percent].”
Thus, the
state statute prohibiting the charging of a check cashing service fee to
non-account holders was in “substantial conflict” with the Comptroller’s regulation pursuant to the National Bank Act that allowed banks
186
to charge these fees.
Therefore, the court correctly held that the
187
state statute was preempted.
Second, the check cashing fee is not an abusive practice. Rather,
charging a check cashing fee to non-account holders is a means of
mitigating the risk of paying on a check with a fraudulent endorsement. The basic rule is that the depository bank is liable for a check
188
paid with a forged endorsement.
When the depository bank presents a check for payment to the drawee or payor bank, the depository bank warrants to the drawee bank that the check does not contain
189
a fraudulent endorsement. If the drawee bank pays on a check that
does contain a fraudulent endorsement, then the drawee bank has
190
recourse against the depository bank. However, if the drawee bank
cashes the check rather than paying the check through the normal
clearance process, then the drawee bank bears the risk of a fraudu191
lent endorsement.
For example, under the facts of the Baptista
192
case, Chase cashed the check for a non-account holder. Therefore,
the bank did not know the payee on the check and could not verify
the signature endorsing the check. As the drawee bank cashing a
check for a non-account holder, Chase assumed the considerable risk
that the endorsement on the check may have been forged. Thus, the
check cashing fee is an appropriate means of mitigating the bank’s
193
substantial risk of paying on a check with a forged endorsement. As
discussed in this Subpart, state laws affecting the depository activities

185
186
187
188

189
190
191
192
193

its discretion, according to sound banking judgment and safe and sound banking principles.” (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 (2001))); accord Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
704 F.3d 712, 723–25 (9th Cir. 2012).
Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1198.
Id. at 1196–98.
Id. at 1198.
U.C.C. §4-208(b) (2002); Craig W. Smith, Drawee Bank Not Required to Examine Checks for
Forged Endorsements, BANKERSONLINE.COM (Mar. 26, 2001), http://www.bankersonline.
com/compliance/v_gurus_cmp032601.html.
U.C.C. §4-208(a) (2002); Smith, supra note 188.
U.C.C. §4-208(b); Smith, supra note 188.
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 51.
Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1196.
But cf. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068–74 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §1693o-2) (addressing interchange transaction fees regarding electronic
debit card transactions). Notably, the Dodd-Frank Act does not address either transaction fees or fraud prevention fees with respect to the cashing of checks for non-account
holders.
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of a national bank, such as standards relating to the terms of deposit
accounts, would “significantly interfere” with the management of a
“core” business of national banks because such laws affect the “risk
194
management” of a bank, including the prevention of fraud.
While the Dodd-Frank Act provided the reform of new procedures
195
to be followed by the Comptroller in preemption determinations,
the Barnett standard of conflict preemption was maintained for State
196
consumer financial laws.
Thus, the doctrine of preemption has
197
been effectively unchanged in this area. The Comptroller and the
courts have the same latitude as before to find State consumer financial laws in conflict with federal laws and therefore preempted. The
law of preemption was also unchanged with regard to state laws that
198
do not qualify as State consumer financial laws.
In contrast, the
statute provided for discriminatory effect preemption as a new stand199
ard for finding preemption of a State consumer financial law.
Thus, the standard for preemption of state law has been broadened
in this respect.
The following Subpart provides an analysis of the standard of review that courts should apply to the Comptroller’s preemption decisions. The Dodd-Frank Act has instituted a significant reform in this
area.
B. Standard of Review
Courts have developed two levels of deference when reviewing ac200
tions by an administrative agency. The “higher level of deference is
known as ‘Chevron deference’” and is based on the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
201
Defense Council, Inc. Courts will provide Chevron deference “when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpreta194
195
196
197

198
199
200
201

Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,557; see also supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 103–10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. With regard to national banks, the statute
addresses only State consumer financial laws. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Schipper, 812 F. Supp. 2d 963 n.1 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (“[T]he
Dodd-Frank Act adopts the same standard applied by the Watters court . . . . Thus, the
Dodd-Frank Act did not materially alter the standard for preemption the Court must apply in this case.”).
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(A) (2012). See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
Bate v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 454 B.R. 869, 877 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
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tion . . . was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”
An
agency may show that it is empowered to act with the force of law “in
a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or
notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a
203
comparable congressional intent.”
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, the standard of review applied to a
decision by the Comptroller of the Currency was based on the Chev204
ron framework.
Under this framework, a court first considers
whether the federal statute reveals an “unambiguously expressed in205
tent of Congress’ that addresses ‘the precise question at issue.’” If
206
Congress’s intent is found, “that is the end of the matter.” A court
207
will enforce that intent. Thus, if “Congress has spoken unambiguously as to the precise question at hand, the court must enforce Congress’ intent” even if the agency empowered to administer the statute
208
has “adopted an alternate interpretation.”
However, if Congress has not “directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” Chevron provided that a court will defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation where it “is based on a permissible
209
construction of the statute” the agency administers. In Chevron, the
Supreme Court further explained that “a court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpreta210
tion made by the administrator of an agency.”
Moreover, if the
agency’s interpretation “represents a reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the
statute, [the courts] should not disturb it unless it appears from the
statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one
211
Courts have interpreted
that Congress would have sanctioned.”
Chevron to “require deference to any reasonable interpretation of the
212
statute offered by the agency.” As stated by the Supreme Court in
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
Id. at 227; David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 146 (2010).
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at
844).
Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted) (quoting Chevron 467 U.S. at 843).
NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995)
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. 997 F.2d at 959 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Chevron,
467 U.S. at 837).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
Id. at 844.
Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
Zaring, supra note 203, at 144.

Apr. 2014]

DEFENSE OF THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION

1069

NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Co., if the agency’s interpretation “fills a gap or defines a term in a
way that is reasonable” the courts will give the agency’s interpretation
213
“controlling weight.”
Thus, where Congress’s intent is not found,
courts will defer to an administrative “agency’s reasonable interpreta214
tion of a statute it is charged with administering.” Courts defer to
agency interpretations under Chevron based on a “presumption” that
when Congress leaves “ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency,” Congress intended that the agency would resolve
the ambiguity and should “possess whatever degree of discretion the
215
ambiguity allows.”
The Comptroller of the Currency is the agency charged with ad216
ministering the National Bank Act.
Congress granted the Comptroller the general authority to “prescribe rules and regulations” un217
der the National Bank Act as well as the specific authority to make
218
preemption determinations under the statute. Thus, if the review-

213
214

215
216

217
218

NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995)
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at
844) (articulating the legal test to determine whether to grant deference to a government
agency’s interpretation of a statute which it administers); see also Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.),
N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996) (“It is our practice to defer to the reasonable judgments of
agencies with regard to the meaning of ambiguous terms in statutes that they are charged
with administering.”); Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 960 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (explaining that if congressional intent is not found, “we must defer to the
agency’s interpretation so long as it is permissible”).
Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740–41 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44).
See Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 525 (stating the fact that the Comptroller of the Currency administers the National Bank Act); see also 12 U.S.C. § 93a (2012) (“[T]he Comptroller of the
Currency is authorized to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the responsibilities
of the office . . . .”); Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739 (“The Comptroller . . . is charged with the enforcement of banking laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of [the rule of deference] with respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws.” (quoting NationsBank of N.C., 513 U.S. at 256–57)); Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 640
F.3d 1194, 1196, 1198 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Congress clearly intended that the [Comptroller] be empowered to regulate banking and banking-related activities.”); Wells Fargo
Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Comptroller of the
Currency . . . is the agency empowered by the [National Bank Act] to supervise and regulate federally chartered banks in accordance with the broad substantive provisions of the
[statute].”).
12 U.S.C. § 93a (2012) .
See id. § 43(a) (explaining that “before issuing any opinion letter or interpretive
rule . . . that concludes that Federal law preempts the application to a national bank of
any State law regarding community reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending, or
the establishment of intrastate branches,” the Comptroller must adhere to certain procedural requirements); see also Rose v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A. 396 F. Supp. 2d
1116, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Pursuant to 11 [sic] U.S.C. § 43 . . . , the OCC possesses the
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ing court finds ambiguity in the meaning of the National Bank Act,
then the Comptroller “can give authoritative meaning to the statute
219
within the bounds of that uncertainty.” However, the existence of
ambiguity in the statute “does not expand Chevron deference to cover
220
virtually any interpretation of the National Bank Act.”
While the
Comptroller’s regulation does not need to be “the best interpretation
of the statute,” the regulation must be a “reasonable” interpretation
221
of the statute.
Courts also will review the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation promulgated pursuant to a statute to determine whether that
222
interpretation is reasonable.
The standard used when an agency
interprets a regulation it has promulgated is provided by Auer v. Rob223
bins.
A court’s first step in determining whether to provide Auer
deference is to consider whether the language of the agency’s regula224
If a reviewing court determines that the agention is ambiguous.
cy’s regulation is “ambiguous as to the precise issue” in question, then
the “agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless

219

220

221

222

223

224

authority to preempt certain state laws.” (citing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 419
F.3d 949, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2005))).
See Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 535 (noting that the Comptroller’s regulation interpreting the
term “visitorial powers” in the National Bank Act to include “‘conducting examinations
[and] inspecting or requiring the production of books or records’” of a national bank is a
reasonable interpretation of the National Bank Act (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2009)));
see also 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (“No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of justice . . . .”).
Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 519 (holding that the Comptroller’s regulation preempting a state’s
enforcement of its own laws in state court is not a reasonable interpretation of the term
“visitorial powers” in the National Bank Act (citing 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000)).
See Smiley, 517 U.S. at 737–40, 744–45, 747 (holding that the Comptroller’s regulation
interpreting the term “interest” in the National Bank Act to include late payment fees on
credit cards is a reasonable interpretation of the statute); see also 12 U.S.C. § 85 (noting
that interest may be charged on any “evidence of debt”); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a) (2011)
(noting that interest “includes any payment compensating a creditor or prospective creditor for an extension of credit” as well as fees associated with the extension of credit, such
as late fees).
See Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 640 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding
preemption where state law conflicts with the Comptroller’s regulation promulgated pursuant to the National Bank Act and the agency’s interpretation of its regulation is “not
unreasonable”); see also 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 (providing for preemption when in accordance
with United States Constitutional principles).
See Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1197–98 (noting that the standard used to determine whether to
defer to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation it has promulgated is Auer deference);
see also Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 458 (1997) (confirming that Auer deference is the legal
standard used when an agency interprets a regulation it has promulgated).
James, 321 F.3d at 494 (citing Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)) (explaining the Auer deference legal test).
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225

it is clearly erroneous.” Thus, under Auer, “an agency’s interpreta226
tion of its own regulation is also entitled to Chevron deference.”
In addition, courts will consider whether the agency’s current in227
terpretation is a deviation from its prior policy.
A deviation from
prior policy may be found when the agency’s new interpretation con228
However, prior
stitutes a “change of official agency position.”
agency letters that contradict a new regulation would likely be “too
229
informal” to be considered a “binding agency policy.” Nevertheless,
Chevron deference has sometimes been afforded based on a new
agency letter in cases where a formal notice and comment rulemak230
ing was not required.
Moreover, while a “[s]udden and unexplained change” or a change that does not consider “legitimate reliance on prior interpretation” may be found to be “arbitrary,
capricious[, or] an abuse of discretion,” change in and of itself is “not

225

226

227

228
229
230

See id. (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461) (holding that the Comptroller’s interpretation of the
term “customer” in its regulation to mean “any person who presents a check for payment”
is not clearly erroneous and, therefore, is controlling; determining that a state statute
which prohibited banks from paying a check drawn on it other than at par regardless of
whether the payee is an account holder at the bank is in “irreconcilable conflict” with the
Comptroller’s regulation permitting national banks to charge fees when cashing checks
for non-account holders, and thus, is preempted); see also 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(a) (providing that national banks may charge “non-interest charges and fees, including deposit account service charges”); cf. Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 531–32 (finding the “Comptroller’s interpretation of its regulation . . . cannot be reconciled with” the regulation or the statute).
Bate v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 454 B.R. 869, 877 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Auer, 519
U.S. at 461) (explaining that where an agency’s regulations were not created by the agency, but rather represent a “codification” of Supreme Court precedent, the agency’s interpretation of its regulations “should not be given Chevron deference” and thus applying
Skidmore-level deference to the Comptroller’s interpretation). The Bate court’s decision to
use a Skidmore standard of review was in part based on the Supreme Court case of Wyeth v.
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). Bate 454 B.R. at 878 & n.57. Wyeth concerned a declaration of preemption by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) with regard to state
law. Wyeth 129 S. Ct. at 1193. The Supreme Court found that Congress had not granted
the FDA authority to preempt state law. Id. at 1201–02. Therefore, the Court applied
Skidmore-level deference. Id. at 1201. In contrast, as the Bate court acknowledged, “the
OCC has been given authority to make determinations on the preemption of consumer
protection laws.” Bate, 454 B.R. at 878.
Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A. 517 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1996) (finding that the Comptroller’s regulation did not constitute a change in the official policy of the agency); Indep.
Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C. Cir 1993) (holding that the
Comptroller’s interpretation of the National Bank Act to permit national banks located
in a town of 5,000 or less to sell insurance outside that town is a reasonable interpretation
of the statute and does not diverge from prior policy).
Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742–43 .
Id. at 743.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 & n.13 (2001) (citing NationsBank of
N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57, 263 (1995) (finding
Chevron deference even in the absence of administrative formalities)).
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231

invalidating.” As stated by the Supreme Court in Smiley v. Citibank
(South Dakota), N.A., “the whole point of Chevron” is that the agency
responsible for interpreting the ambiguities of a statute should have
the discretion to interpret that statute, including the discretion to
232
change its interpretation.
The second and lower level of deference is “Skidmore deference”
233
based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
Skidmore deference generally applies when an agency is not acting
234
with the force of law. In contrast to the higher level Chevron defer235
236
ence, which is based on a “reasonableness” standard, the level of
deference provided to an agency under the Skidmore standard is based
on “the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to per237
suade.” There is a significant distinction between the two levels of
deference. Under Chevron, a court is deciding whether the agency’s
interpretation is “within the bounds of reasonableness” notwithstanding the possibility that the court itself may have arrived at a different
238
interpretation.
Under Skidmore, the court itself is deciding how to
best interpret the law with the agency’s interpretation provided as a
239
reference. Under Chevron deference, the courts “must defer” to an
agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute; however, under Skidmore deference, the courts “may defer” depending upon the persua240
siveness of the agency’s interpretation. Thus, in contrast to Chevron

231
232

233
234

235
236
237

238
239
240

Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742 (“[T]he mere fact that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior
agency position is not fatal.”).
Id.; see also NationsBank of N.C., 513 U.S. at 263 (“[A]ny change in the Comptroller’s position might reduce, but would not eliminate, the deference we owe his reasoned determinations.”).
Bate v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 454 B.R. 869, 877 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
Mead, 533 U.S. at 237 (“Chevron left Skidmore intact and applicable where statutory circumstances indicate no intent to delegate general authority to make rules with force of law, or
where such authority was not invoked . . . .”); Zaring, supra note 203, at 145–46 (explaining the difference between Chevron deference and Skidmore deference).
Bate, 454 B.R. at 877 (explaining the levels of deference accorded agency interpretations
of which Chevron deference is the most deferential).
See supra notes 210–14 and accompanying text.
Bate, 454 B.R. at 877 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (explaining the factors involved in determining the level of deference to grant under the
Skidmore standard).
William Funk, Judicial Deference and Regulatory Preemption by Federal Agencies, 84 TUL. L. REV.
1233, 1241 (2010) .
Id.
Zaring, supra note 203, at 146.
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deference, agency interpretations reviewed under Skidmore deference
241
are “not controlling upon the courts.”
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress adopted Skidmore deference as
the new standard of review of a decision by the Comptroller to
242
preempt a state law. Under the statute, a court reviewing a preemption determination by the Comptroller must “assess the validity of
such determinations” based upon (i) the thoroughness of the Comptroller’s consideration, (ii) the validity of the Comptroller’s reasoning, (iii) the consistency with the Comptroller’s other valid determi243
nations, and (iv) any other persuasive and relevant factors.
Thus,
courts must now use the four part Skidmore test in reviewing a
244
Moreover, the new
preemption decision by the Comptroller.
standard of review is applicable to the Comptroller’s preemption determinations regarding any state laws, not only State consumer finan245
cial laws.
Congress apparently has decided to accord the Comptroller the
246
lower level of deference under Skidmore, even though Congress has
delegated to the Comptroller the general authority “to make rules
carrying the force of law” in its role as the agency charged with ad247
ministering the National Bank Act. An agency determination made
under such congressional delegation of authority is normally provid248
ed with Chevron-level deference. In the context of preemption, this
agency deference was bolstered by the Supreme Court’s determination that a “pre-emptive regulation’s force does not depend on ex249
press congressional authorization” to preempt state law.
Thus, an
agency may rely on its general rulemaking authority and does not
250
need express congressional authority to preempt state law. Howev241
242

243
244
245

246
247
248
249
250

Id. (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5) (2012) (setting forth Skidmore deference as the standard of review to be used when courts review preemption determinations by the Comptroller); see
also Bate, 454 B.R. at 877 n.46 (“Skidmore level deference has been incorporated in the
new Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act . . . .”).
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A).
Id.; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (establishing a four-part test for deference).
See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (“A court reviewing any determinations made by the Comptroller regarding preemption of a State law by title 62 of the Revised Statutes or section
371 of this title shall assess the validity of such determinations . . . .” (emphasis added)).
Id.
United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see also supra notes 216–17 and
accompanying text.
See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982).
Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 768
(2008) (finding the Supreme Court’s statement to indicate only an implied proposition
of general agency authority to preempt state law).
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er, the Comptroller’s authority to make preemption determinations
does not rest solely on Supreme Court precedent. Congress has delegated to the Comptroller the specific authority to make preemption
251
determinations under the National Bank Act.
As a result, the
Comptroller has been accorded Chevron-level deference in its determinations pursuant to the National Bank Act, including its determi252
nations of preemption.
Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act marks a sea
change in the level of deference provided to the Comptroller’s deci253
sions to preempt a state law.
However, the effect of this shift in the standard of review remains
to be seen. As a practical matter, it is unlikely a court will refuse to
provide deference to an agency interpretation that is reasonable even
254
if the lower level Skidmore deference is applied. Moreover, scholars
have argued that “the ‘reasonable agency’ standard is, increasingly
clearly the standard that courts actually apply to all exercises of judicial review of administrative action, no matter what standard they
255
purport to use.” Taken a step further, in the Baptista case, despite
the court expressly acknowledging the preemption standard set forth
in the Dodd-Frank Act, the Eleventh Circuit did not even allude to
256
the statute’s new Skidmore standard of review. Instead, the Eleventh
Circuit simply noted that Auer level deference should be applied
257
when an agency is interpreting its own regulations. Thus, the court
applied the Chevron reasonableness standard to the Comptroller’s interpretation of its regulation promulgated pursuant to the National
258
Bank Act.
The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning regarding the standard of review
259
in the Baptista case poses some questions. Why did the court follow
the Dodd-Frank Act with respect to the standard for preemption, yet
fail to follow the statute’s directive regarding the standard of re260
view? The simple answer may be that the preemption provisions of
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260

See 12 U.S.C. § 43 (2012) (statute authorizing the Comptroller to preempt state law in
accordance with the National Bank Act).
See supra notes 204, 219 and accompanying text.
See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (referring to the section of the statute that accords Skidmore
deference as the standard of review for preemption).
Zaring, supra note 203, at 159.
Id. at 137.
Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 640 F.3d 1194, 1197–98 (11th Cir. 2011); see supra
note 242 and accompanying text.
Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1197–98.
Id. at 1198 (adopting the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning to find preemption by the federal regulation at issue, in accordance with the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation).
See generally id. at 1197–98.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 25b(b)(1)(B), (5)(A) (2012); Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1197–98.
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the Dodd-Frank Act, while enacted, were a little over two months
261
On the other hand, given the court’s
short of the effective date.
lack of acknowledgement of the statute’s new standard of review, is
the Eleventh Circuit’s application of Auer deference and determination of Chevron reasonableness in the Baptista case an indication that
courts will continue to give deference to preemption interpretations
by the Comptroller that are reasonable even under the statute’s new
262
Skidmore standard?
While these questions may not be answered
imminently and certainly not unequivocally, it is possible that some
courts reviewing a determination by the Comptroller to preempt a
state law may continue to use the reasonableness standard of Chev263
ron.
Nevertheless, an examination of the new four-prong standard of
review is warranted. The first prong directs a reviewing court to assess the thoroughness of the Comptroller’s consideration in deciding
264
to preempt a state law.
Courts have interpreted this prong to re265
quire “in-depth consideration of the disputed issue.” Arguably, this
prong presents a more rigorous standard of review of the Comptrol266
ler’s preemption determinations than required under Chevron.
However, at least with respect to State consumer financial laws, the
new procedures the Comptroller must follow in making a preemp267
tion determination should meet the “thoroughness” requirement.
For example, any determination by the Comptroller under the Barnett standard preemption provision may be made either “by regula268
tion or order . . . on a case-by-case basis.” In each case, the Comptroller must make a determination about the effect of the “particular
State consumer financial law” on national banks subject to that state
269
law or the law of another state with “substantively equivalent terms.”

261

262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269

The preemption provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act became effective on the designated
transfer date, which the Act defined as one year after the date of enactment. The date of
enactment was July 21, 2010; thus, the transfer date was July 21, 2011. See Dodd-Frank
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, pmbl., 124 Stat. 1376.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 25b note (2010) (“Enactment and amendment of section by Pub. L. 111-203 effective on the designated transfer date . . . .”). The Eleventh Circuit decided the Baptista case on May 11, 2011. Baptista,
640 F.3d at 1194.
See Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1197–98; 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A).
See, e.g., Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1197–98; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984).
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A).
Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2009).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45.
See 12 U.S.C. § 25(b)(5)(A); Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,551 n.11.
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B).
Id. § 25b(b)(3)(A).
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The Comptroller must consult with the BCFP in determining that the
law of another state is “substantively equivalent” to the state law at is270
sue. Moreover, the Comptroller may not preempt a State consumer
financial law “unless substantial evidence, made on the record of the
proceeding, supports the specific finding [of preemption] in accord271
ance with the legal standard” of the Barnett decision.
Thus, these
new requirements appear to build in a level of thoroughness in the
Comptroller’s determinations which should be sufficient to withstand
judicial review of this prong.
The second prong requires a court to assess the validity of the
272
Comptroller’s reasoning in making a preemption determination.
In reviewing the validity of an agency’s reasoning, a court will consider “whether an agency pronouncement is well-reasoned, substantiat273
ed, and logical.”
Thus, the question is whether this prong introduces a more rigorous standard than the Chevron reasonableness test,
274
or whether this prong is simply a codification of Chevron. Arguably,
for a decision to be reasonable, that decision must be well-reasoned,
275
For example, in Colaio v.
logical, and substantiated or supported.

270
271
272
273

274
275

Id. § 25b(b)(3)(B).
Id. § 25b(c).
Id. § 25b(b)(5)(A).
De La Mota v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 412 F.3d 71, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 597 F. Supp. 2d 370, 391
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that the Commission’s opinion letter regarding the phthalate
proscriptions of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act “does not demonstrate
the thoroughness of consideration and validity of reasoning that would warrant deference
under Skidmore”).
See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984).
See generally NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 253,
263–64 (1995) (holding that the Comptroller’s interpretation of the National Bank Act
regarding the brokerage of annuities is reasonable and finding that “any change in the
Comptroller’s position might reduce, but would not eliminate, the deference . . . owe[d]
[to] his reasoned determinations”); Baptista v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 640 F.3d 1194,
1198 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that the Comptroller’s interpretation of the term “customer” to include “any person presenting a check for payment” was supported by the National Bank Act and the Comptroller’s regulation promulgated thereunder, and, thus,
that it was not unreasonable); Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 279, 289, 300
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding the Special Master’s interpretive policies with respect to the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund in the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act to be valid under Skidmore because the “policies do not contradict the Act or
its regulations, are supported by evidence and valid reasoning . . . are persuasive as carrying out congressional intent . . . [and thus] are reasonable and proper implementations
of the Act and regulations”); Hadley v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 303 P.3d 1037, 1040
(Utah Ct. App. 2013) (finding that “[a] claimant acts reasonably where ‘the decision to
quit [is] logical, sensible, or practical’” (quoting Utah Admin. Code R994-405103(1)(a))).
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Feinberg, a federal district court held that a Special Master’s interpretive policies with regard to the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund were valid under the Skidmore standard because, inter alia, the
policies “[were] supported by evidence and valid reasoning,” and
276
were therefore reasonable.
Additionally, in Hadley v. Workforce Appeals Board, the court explained that a claimant for unemployment
benefits “act[ed] reasonably” when, inter alia, the decision to resign is
277
“logical, sensible, or practical . . . .” Thus, borrowing from other
fields of law, this prong may be interpreted to be a codification of the
278
Chevron reasonableness standard. Nevertheless, this prong will likely be the crux of a court’s standard of review analysis.
The third prong requires a court to assess whether the decision is
279
consistent with the Comptroller’s other valid determinations.
As
discussed in this Part, this prong historically has been applied by
courts in reviewing the Comptroller’s decisions under the Chevron
280
standard.
Thus, this prong does not change the standard applied
to the Comptroller’s determinations; rather, this prong merely codifies judicial precedent.
The fourth prong provides a reviewing court with discretion to
281
consider any other persuasive and relevant factors.
This formulation is a slight variation of the Skidmore standard, which provides for a
court to consider “all those factors which give [the agency] power to
282
persuade.”
Courts have interpreted this prong of the Skidmore
standard to include consideration of the agency’s thoroughness, the
validity of its reasoning, and its consistency as factors that “either contribute[] to or detract[] from the power of an agency’s interpretation
283
to persuade.” However, additional factors may be considered, such
as the agency’s expertise, “as factors in an agency’s power to per284
suade.”
In considering whether this catch-all prong introduces a more
rigorous standard of review of the Comptroller’s preemption decisions, it is notable that under the Chevron reasonableness test, courts

276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284

Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 279, 289, 300.
Hadley, 303 P.3d at 1040.
See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45; Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 279,
289, 300; Hadley, 303 P.3d at 1040.
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A).
See supra notes 227–31 and accompanying text.
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A).
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 80–81 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
Id. (citing Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1257 (2007)).
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are not restricted in considering any persuasive and relevant factors
285
in deciding whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.
Moreover, the Comptroller’s expertise in the area of national bank286
ing law is well settled. Thus, any persuasive and relevant factors reviewed under this prong are likely to provide additional support to a
court’s decision rather than introduce a more rigorous standard of
review of the Comptroller’s preemption determinations.
Thus, while the Dodd-Frank Act’s new standard of review marks a
sea change in the level of deference to be accorded to the Comptrol287
ler in his preemption determinations, the ultimate effect of this reform may, in practice, be minimal. All in all, the standard of review
to be used in reviewing agency actions has always been a source of
288
debate, and Congress’s decision to employ a new standard to be
used in reviewing the Comptroller’s determinations to preempt state
laws will likely be a source of continuing disagreement and idiosyncratic application by the courts.
The next Subpart addresses the issue of subsidiary preemption.
While the Dodd-Frank Act endeavored to provide a meaningful reform in this area of preemption law, the effort is based on an unfounded premise.
C. Subsidiaries of National Banks
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, the preemption law with respect to subsidiaries of national banks was governed by the Supreme Court’s de289
An analysis of the case is
cision in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.
worthwhile to appreciate the many considerations involved in the issue of subsidiary preemption.
1. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.
The Watters case addressed the question of whether the mortgage
lending activities conducted by an operating subsidiary of a national
bank were subject to state reporting, licensing, and visitorial re285

286
287
288

289

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–66 (1984)
(considering how clearly Congress has spoken on the issue and the reasonableness of the
agency’s interpretation without limiting the factors considered in the analysis; the Court
considered, inter alia, the statutory language and the legislative history).
See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (2012).
Zaring, supra note 203, at 138, 152; see also Funk, supra note 238, at 1253 (“The doctrine
describing judicial deference to federal agency opinions is riddled with inconsistencies
and disparate application.”).
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
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290

quirements.
Specifically, the case concerned a Michigan state law
that required “mortgage brokers, lenders and servicers that are subsidiaries of national banks to register with the [state] and submit to
291
state supervision.”
In addition, the Michigan law authorized the
state commissioner to “take regulatory or enforcement action against
292
covered lenders” under the state statute. Wachovia Bank was a national bank that conducted its real estate lending activities through a
state-chartered, wholly owned corporation approved by the Comp293
troller as an operating subsidiary of Wachovia Bank.
As discussed by the Watters Court, the National Bank Act provides
national banks with an express authorization to “engage in real estate
294
lending.”
Further, the statute permits national banks “[t]o exercise . . . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
295
business of banking.” A national bank’s incidental powers include
the power to “conduct certain activities through ‘operating subsidiar296
ies.’” Such “operating subsidiaries” are “authorized to engage solely
in activities the [national] bank itself could undertake, and [are] subject to the same terms and conditions as those applicable to the [na297
tional] bank.”
As the Court pointed out, the Comptroller supervises operating
subsidiaries of national banks in the same manner as national
298
banks. Moreover, the Comptroller “treats national banks and their
operating subsidiaries as a single economic enterprise” and “appl[ies]
the same controls whether banking ‘activities are conducted directly
299
or through an operating subsidiary.’”
Citing the Barnett decision, the Watters Court found that the determination of preemption focuses “on the exercise of a bank’s pow290

291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298

299

Id. at 7, 14 (“Visitation . . . is the act of a superior or superintending officer, who visits a
corporation to examine into its manner of conducting business, and enforce an observance of its laws and regulations.” (quoting Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 158
(1905))).
Id. at 8 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.1656(1) (2002), 445.1679(1)(a) (2002),
493.52(1) (1998), 493.53a(d) (1998)).
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7, 12 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 371).
Id. at 7, 11 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24).
Id. at 7, 15–16 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A); 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e) (2006)).
Id. at 7, 18 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A); 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)).
Id. at 16 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(3)); see also U.S. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, RELATED ORGANIZATIONS: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 53 (2004) [hereinafter
COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK] (“Operating subsidiaries are subject to the same supervision
and regulation as the parent bank, except where otherwise provided by law or OCC regulation.”).
Watters, 550 U.S. at 17.
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300

ers, not on its corporate structure.” According to the Watters Court,
“[a] national bank has the power to engage in real estate lending
through an operating subsidiary, subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the national bank itself; that power cannot be sig301
nificantly impaired or impeded by state law.”
Moreover, “[t]o prevent inconsistent or intrusive state regulation
from impairing” the powers granted to national banks, the National
Bank Act provides that “‘[n]o national bank shall be subject to any
visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law,’ vested in the
302
courts of justice.” As stated by the Watters Court, the National Bank
Act was specifically “designed to prevent” the “diverse and duplicative
303
superintendence of national banks” by the states.
Thus, the Court held that the mortgage lending activities of Wachovia Bank, “whether conducted by the bank itself or through the
bank’s operating subsidiary, [were] subject to” the sole superintend304
ence of the Comptroller of the Currency.
Neither the national
bank nor its operating subsidiary was subject to state mandated re305
porting, licensing, or visitorial requirements.
2. Reversal of Watters by the Dodd-Frank Act
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress addressed preemption with re306
spect to subsidiaries and affiliates of national banks.
A State consumer financial law will be applicable to any “subsidiary or affiliate of
a national bank” that is not itself a national bank “to the same extent
that the State consumer financial law applies to any person, corpora307
tion, or other entity subject to such State law.”
Under this provision, the Dodd-Frank Act eliminated preemption for operating subsidiaries of national banks with respect to State consumer financial
308
laws.
The Dodd-Frank Act further provides that the “applicability of any
State law to any subsidiary or affiliate of a national bank” that is not
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308

Id. at 18 (citing Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996)).
Id. at 21 (citing Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33–34; 12 U.S.C §§ 24 (Seventh), 24a(g)(3)(A),
371).
Id. at 11, 13–14 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 484(a)).
Id. at 13–14; see also id. at 11 (“[F]ederal control shields national banks from unduly burdensome and duplicative state regulation.”).
Id. at 7.
Id. (explaining that reporting, licensing and visitorial requirements mandated by the state
do not apply to the national bank or its operating subsidiary).
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(2), (e), (h)(2) (2012).
Id. § 25b(e).
Id.
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itself a national bank will not be preempted, annulled, or affected by
309
Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act reversed the
the federal banking laws.
Watters opinion and eliminated preemption for operating subsidiaries
of national banks with respect to all state laws, not only State con310
sumer financial laws. Therefore, operating subsidiaries of national
311
banks must comply with all state laws.
A clarifying distinction should be made here. As discussed in Part
II.A, with respect to national banks, the Dodd-Frank Act does not address the preemption of state laws other than State consumer finan312
cial laws. Thus, as it pertains to national banks, the Dodd-Frank Act
313
addresses preemption of State consumer financial laws only. However, with respect to subsidiaries of national banks, the Dodd-Frank
Act addresses all state laws and eliminates preemption of all state laws
314
for subsidiaries of national banks.
3. Elimination of Subsidiary Preemption
While these provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act were enacted in the
spirit of reform, the elimination of preemption for subsidiaries of national banks will be exceedingly more burdensome on the national
charter. National banks must ensure that every subsidiary complies
not only with federal law but also with the particular laws of the many
315
states in which the subsidiary is doing business.
Moreover, these
provisions appear to be based on one of two concerns: (i) the concern that an operating subsidiary of a national bank engaged in
mortgage activities would unduly benefit from the preemption of
state laws by conducting its mortgage lending business in a manner
that would harm the inhabitants of the particular state, or (ii) the
concern that an operating subsidiary of a national bank engaged in
mortgage activities would unduly benefit by the preemption of state
laws by conducting its mortgage lending business unfettered by state
laws while its state-regulated competitors would be held to those state
laws, thereby creating an unequal playing field in favor of the nation316
al bank subsidiaries.
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316

Id. § 25b(b)(2), (h)(2) (emphasis added).
Id. § 25b(b)(2), (e), (h)(2); see Watters, 550 U.S. at 7.
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(2), (e), (h)(2).
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
12 U.S.C. § 25b.
Id. § 25b(b)(2), (e), (h)(2).
Id.
See generally 156 CONG. REC. S5870-02 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (explaining that one of the
purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act is “to protect consumers”); see also Watters v. Wachovia
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With respect to the first concern, as found by the Supreme Court
in the Watters opinion, the Comptroller regulates a national bank and
317
Both the Compits operating subsidiaries as one economic unit.
troller and Congress have viewed a national bank and its operating
subsidiaries as a single economic enterprise “for accounting purposes, regulatory reporting purposes, and for purposes of applying many
318
Federal statutory or regulatory limits.”
Similarly, in determining
whether national banks have the power to engage in new activities,
the Supreme Court has consistently viewed national banks and their
319
operating subsidiaries as a single entity.
Moreover, Congress has
expressly provided that an operating subsidiary of a national bank
may engage “solely in activities that national banks are permitted to
engage in directly and are conducted subject to the same terms and
conditions that govern the conduct of such activities by national
320
banks.” Thus, operating subsidiaries are subject to the same rigors
of regulatory oversight the Comptroller applies to the parent national
321
bank.
Perhaps due to the regulatory oversight, operating subsidiaries of
national banks were not responsible for originating the vast majority
of subprime mortgages in the years leading up to the subprime mort322
gage crisis. Rather, as will be discussed in Part III.B, state-regulated
lending institutions, for which federal preemption did not apply,
were responsible for underwriting the overwhelming majority of sub323
prime mortgages.
Moreover, evidence indicates that subprime
lenders regulated by the states, in particular independent mortgage

317
318

319

320

321
322
323

Bank, N.A. 550 U.S. 1, 43 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he primary advantage of
maintaining an operating subsidiary as a separate corporation is that it shields the national bank from the operating subsidiaries’ liabilities. . . . The federal interest in protecting depositors in national banks from their subsidiaries’ liabilities surely does not justify a
grant of immunity from laws that apply to competitors.”).
Watters, 530 U.S. at 17 (citing COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 298, at 64).
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 7 & n.5, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 334 F.
Supp. 2d 957 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (Civ. Act. No. 5:03-CV-0105), aff’d, 550 U.S. 1 (2007)
(citing 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(2)(A); 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(4)).
See, e.g., NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 254
(1995) (permitting sale of annuities by operating subsidiary); Marquette Nat’l Bank v.
First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 301–02 (1978) (permitting credit card subsidiary to employ the usury laws of its home state when issuing credit cards in another state).
12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A) (2012). In contrast, other affiliates of national banks may engage in activities that are not permitted for national banks to engage in directly. See id.
§24a(a)(2)(A)(i) (authorizing financial subsidiaries to engage in activities that are “financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity”).
Watters, 550 U.S. at 17 (citing COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 298, at 64).
See infra note 443 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 438–42 and accompanying text.
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companies regulated solely by the states, engaged in abusive lending
324
practices. For example, Congress has found that many prospective
borrowers were steered into accepting mortgage loans they could not
325
afford. Therefore, operating subsidiaries of national banks did not
unduly benefit from the preemption of state laws. Instead, stateregulated lending institutions were the entities that conducted their
mortgage lending businesses in a manner that harmed the inhabitants of the state in which they were operating.
With respect to the second concern, the operating subsidiaries of
national banks are held to federal law by the Comptroller of the Cur326
rency. In contrast, as further discussed in Part III.B, nothing in the
doctrine of preemption prevented the states from regulating and enforcing state laws with respect to state-regulated lending institutions,
327
for which federal preemption did not apply.
Yet, these stateregulated institutions were responsible for originating the vast majority of subprime mortgages, despite the unfettered ability of the states
328
to regulate these lenders.
Clearly, the market recognized this imbalance in regulatory oversight, as evidenced by the significant share
of subprime mortgages originated by state-regulated lending institu329
tions.
As a result, national banks and their operating subsidiaries
were, in effect, unduly harmed by the apparent difference in regulatory oversight applied to the state-regulated lending institutions,
thereby creating an unequal playing field in favor of the state-regulated
lenders and not the other way around.
For example, the subprime mortgage crisis caused an overall mar330
ket decline in housing prices. As a result, many homeowners expe331
Negative equity, or more commonly an
rienced negative equity.
“underwater” mortgage, occurs when the value of the home is re332
duced below the mortgage balance.
While declines in housing
prices initially affected subprime loans because these mortgages generally included minimal or no down payments, as housing prices con-

324
325

326
327
328
329
330
331
332

See infra notes 436, 453–54 and accompanying text.
156 CONG. REC. S5870 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (Remarks of Sen. Akaka) (“Prospective
homebuyers were steered into mortgage products that had risks and costs that they could
not understand or afford.”).
Watters, 550 U.S. at 16–17.
See infra notes 434–37 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 438–42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 439, 441 and accompanying text.
The Downturn in Facts and Figures, BBC NEWS, Nov. 21, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/business/7073131.stm.
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 2, at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
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tinued to decline, “even many prime borrowers who had made sizeable down payments fell underwater,” resulting in a high level of de333
For example, NBT
linquencies in the housing finance market.
Bancorp Inc., the holding company of NBT Bank, National Associa334
tion, was not active in the subprime mortgage market.
Yet, delinquencies in the bank’s residential mortgages increased nearly five
335
times between 2007 and 2012. Moreover, losses on residential real
336
estate loans during the same time period more than tripled. Thus,
national banks and their operating subsidiaries were unduly harmed
by the decline in housing prices. This decline was set in motion by
the state-regulated lending institutions, which originated the over337
whelming majority of subprime mortgages, ultimately resulting in
338
the subprime mortgage crisis.
As another example, some national banks acquired investments in
mortgage-backed securities backed by “poorly underwritten subprime
mortgages, unduly relying on the investment grade ratings” of these
339
securities.
Mortgage-backed securities are created by pooling together various mortgages and creating a debt security that is sold to
340
investors. When the subprime mortgage market collapsed, many of
these mortgage-backed securities became impaired causing losses to
341
investors, including national banks.
333
334

335

336

337
338
339

340

341

Id. at 5.
NBT BANCORP INC., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 41 (2013) (noting that “[s]ubprime mortgage
lending, which has been the riskiest sector of the residential housing market, is not a
market that [NBT Bancorp Inc.] has ever actively pursued,” instead, NBT Bancorp Inc. “is
a prime lender”).
Residential real estate mortgages placed on nonaccrual status increased from $1,372,000
in 2007 to $8,083,000 in 2012. Compare NBT BANCORP INC., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 30
(2008), with NBT BANCORP INC., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 334, at 49. Loans are
placed on nonaccrual status, that is, interest is no longer accrued on the loans, when
payments become delinquent. Compare NBT BANCORP INC., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 334, at 71, with NBT BANCORP INC., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 335, at 52.
FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, UNIFORM BANK PERFORMANCE REPORT (2007),
available at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/Reports/UbprReport.aspx?rptCycleIds=47%
2c72%2c45%2c44%2c43&rptid=283&idrssd=702117&peerGroupType=&supplemental
(last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (recording that losses on residential real estate mortgages, as a
percentage of total loans, increased from 0.07% in 2007 to 0.29% in 2012).
See infra notes 439, 441 and accompanying text.
See infra note 404 and accompanying text.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, STATEMENT OF JOHN C. DUGAN,
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BEFORE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION 9–
10 (2010) [hereinafter Statement of John C. Dugan].
See Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit, 318 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REP 5 (2008), available at
https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/60823/1/587537833.pdf.
See generally KATALINA M. BIANCO, THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF
THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 12–15 (2008), available at http://business.cch.com/
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In sum, the elimination of preemption for subsidiaries of national
banks will be particularly burdensome on the national charter and is
regrettably based upon an unfounded premise. Undoubtedly, national banks will respond to this change by merging their operating
subsidiaries into the parent bank rather than incurring the burdensome cost of complying with the diverse laws of the fifty states.
The following Subpart will discuss the visitorial powers provision
of the National Bank Act and the ability of the states to enforce laws
against national banks.
C. Visitation
The National Bank Act provides that “[n]o national bank shall be
subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law,
342
vested in the courts of justice.” The Comptroller had issued a regulation interpreting the term “visitorial powers” to include “conducting examinations, inspecting or requiring the production of books or
records of national banks, or prosecuting enforcement actions”
343
against national banks. The regulation also affirmed that only the
Comptroller of the Currency “may exercise visitorial powers with re344
spect to national banks . . . .” Thus, under the Comptroller’s regulation, only the Comptroller of the Currency had the authority to pros345
ecute enforcement actions against national banks.
The Supreme Court considered the statutory term “visitorial powers” in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n and found the Comptroller had
reasonably interpreted “visitorial powers” to include “conducting examinations and inspecting or requiring the production of books or
346
records of national banks.”
However, the Supreme Court did not
find reasonable the Comptroller’s extension of the term “visitorial
347
powers” to include prosecuting enforcement actions in state court.
According to the Court, a state’s visitorial powers should be distin-

342
343
344
345

346
347

bankingfinance/focus/news/Subprime_WP_rev.pdf (“[T]ens of billions of dollars worth
of mortgage-backed paper all but disappeared.”).
12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2012).
12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a) (2009).
Id.
See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (noting that the Comptroller’s “regulation prohibits the States from prosecuting enforcement actions” with respect
to national banks (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Nat’l State Bank, Elizabeth, N.J. v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 989 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[E]nforcement of the state statute is
the responsibility of the Comptroller of the Currency rather than the State Commissioner.”).
Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 535–36.
Id. at 525, 536.
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guished from its power to enforce the law, and only the former is
348
preempted by the National Bank Act. Moreover, the purpose of the
statute’s reservation of powers “vested in the courts of justice” was in349
tended to preserve the courts’ ordinary powers of enforcing the law.
Thus, the Court held that a state attorney general is permitted to
350
bring judicial enforcement actions against national banks.
Remarkably, the Cuomo Court asserted that its prior decision in
Watters was fully in accord with the distinction between supervision
351
and law enforcement. However, the state regulations preempted in
352
Watters included the power to enforce the law. One may query how
the Court’s prior decision in Watters was fully in accord with the distinction between supervision and law enforcement, when the Watters
decision preempted a state law that included the power of law enforcement. Yet, the Cuomo Court did not address this inconsistency in
its reasoning. Rather, the Cuomo Court maintained that “the sole
question [in Watters] was whether operating subsidiaries of national
banks enjoyed the same immunity from state visitation” as the parent
353
national bank.
Thus, the Cuomo Court narrowed the scope of the
Watters decision to apply only to the question of how operating subsidiaries of national banks are to be treated with respect to state visita354
tion, without acknowledging that state visitation in the Watters case
355
included the power to enforce the law.
Congress also addressed the issue of visitorial powers in the DoddFrank Act. In accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Cuomo, the visitation provisions of federal banking law do not limit or restrict the authority of a state attorney general “to enforce an applica356
ble law” against a national bank by bringing an action in court.
348
349
350
351
352

353
354
355

356

Id. at 526–29.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 528.
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 550 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2007); see also Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 552
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court was fully aware that the Michigan statutes [in Watters] granted state banking commissioners the very enforcement authority that petitioner
seeks to exert over the national banks in this case.”).
Id. at 528.
See id. at 528–29 (stating explicitly that “[t]he opinion addresses and answers no other
question”).
See id. at 552–53 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s conclusion in Watters that §
484(a) deprives the States of inspection and enforcement authority over the mortgagelending practices of national banks lends weight to the agency’s construction of the statute.”).
12 U.S.C. § 25b(i)(1) (2012). However, a state attorney general is restricted in conducting non-judicial investigations or oversight of a national bank. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)
(2011).
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Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act codified the Cuomo decision. A state attorney general has the authority to bring an action against a national
358
bank in court to enforce a non-preempted state law. These visitorial powers provisions apply to federal thrifts and their subsidiaries “to
the same extent and in the same manner” as national banks and na359
tional bank subsidiaries.
The codification of the Cuomo decision may result in any of three
potential outcomes. The states may serve as a back-up enforcement
authority to the federal regulators. For example, if a federal regulator fails to enforce an applicable law against a national bank, a federal thrift, or their respective subsidiaries, then the states may use this
enforcement power to bring an action in court to enforce that law.
Alternatively, the states may use this enforcement power collaboratively by working together with the federal regulator to ensure that
applicable laws are enforced. Then again, the states may choose to
work independently of the federal regulator, potentially resulting in
the duplicative enforcement regimes that the Watters Court sought to
360
avoid.
Additionally, as discussed in Part III.B, states have always had the
sole power to regulate and enforce applicable laws with respect to in361
dependent mortgage companies. Notwithstanding this absolute authority held by the states, independent mortgage companies were responsible for originating the vast majority of subprime mortgage
362
363
loans. With the codification of the Cuomo decision, it remains to
be seen whether or not the states will use this relatively new enforcement power with respect to national banks and federal thrifts in an
effective manner.
The next Subpart will explore the doctrine of preemption regarding federal savings associations and the particularly apposite reform
established by the Dodd-Frank Act.

357
358
359
360

361
362
363

See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(i)(1) (noting the statute expressly states that it is “[i]n accordance
with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Cuomo ”).
See Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,552 (grounding its assertion on the
Supreme Court opinion in Cuomo).
12 U.S.C. § 1465(c) .
See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 550 U.S. 1, 13–14 (2007) (noting the National Bank
Act was specifically “designed to prevent” the “diverse and duplicative superintendence of
national banks” by the states).
See infra note 442 and accompanying text.
See infra note 441 and accompanying text.
See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(i)(1) .
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D. Federal Savings Associations
As discussed in Part I.A, the Home Owner’s Loan Act was viewed
by some courts as occupying the field with respect to federal savings
364
associations. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that “federal
law preempts the field of prepayments of real estate loans to federally
chartered savings and loan associations, so that any California law in
the area is inapplicable to federal savings and loan associations oper365
ating within California.” Moreover, a field preemption standard for
federal savings associations was explicitly set forth in regulations
promulgated by the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”), the prior
366
regulator of federal thrifts. As provided by the regulations, the OTS
“occupies the entire field of . . . deposit-related regulations” and the
“entire field of lending regulation” with respect to federal savings as367
sociations.
Even the Supreme Court has given an implicit nod to
the field preemption doctrine for federal savings associations. As expressed by the Court in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan v. de la Cuesta,
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the first regulator of federal
368
thrifts) was authorized by the HOLA to promulgate comprehensive
“regulations governing ‘the powers and operations of every [f]ederal
369
savings and loan association from its cradle to its corporate grave.’”
More specifically, the Court found that the “broad language of the
[HOLA] expresses no limits on the [Federal Home Loan Bank]
Board’s authority to regulate the lending practices of federal savings
370
and loans.”

364
365
366

367

368

369

370

See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1974).
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5411, 5412 (transferring all functions of the Office of Thrift Supervision
with respect to federal savings associations to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency effective July 21, 2011).
12 C.F.R. § 557.11(b) (2011) (authorizing the scope of authority with respect to depositrelated regulations); id. § 560.2(a) (authorizing the scope of authority with respect to
lending regulation).
See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 144 (1982) (“The [Federal
Home Loan Bank] Board . . . was formed in 1932 and thereafter was vested with plenary
authority to administer the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 . . . .” (citation omitted)).
Id. at 144–45 (quoting California v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316
(S.D. Cal. 1951)); Meyers, 499 F.2d at 1146–47 (quoting Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F.
Supp. at 316).
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 161 (emphasis added) (“Congress plainly envisioned that federal
savings and loans would be governed by what the Board-not any particular state-deemed
to be the ‘best practices.’”); see also First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Bos. v. Tax Comm’n of
Mass., 437 U.S. 255, 258 n.3 (1978) (noting that the HOLA “protects federal associations
from being forced into the state regulatory mold”).
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However, as part of the reform legislation, the Dodd-Frank Act
changed the preemption standards applicable to federal savings associations to conform to the legal standards applicable to national
371
banks.
Congress also expressly provided that the Home Owners’
372
373
Loan Act “does not occupy the field in any area of [s]tate law.”
Thus, federal savings associations will no longer benefit from field
preemption. Instead, in accordance with the legal standards applicable to national banks, the conflict preemption standard of Barnett will
374
be applied to federal thrifts.
Moreover, operating subsidiaries of
federal thrifts will no longer benefit from any type of preemption.
Instead, in accordance with the legal standards applicable to operating subsidiaries of national banks, operating subsidiaries of federal
375
thrifts will be subject to relevant state laws.
In considering this change in the preemption standard for federal
376
thrifts from field preemption to conflict preemption, it is important
to understand the initial divergence in preemption standards between national banks and federal thrifts. As provided in the HOLA,
one of the primary purposes for the creation of thrift institutions was
377
to provide financing for home ownership.
Indeed, the Supreme
Court has noted that the “HOLA, a product of the Great Depression
of the 1930’s, was intended ‘to provide emergency relief with respect
to home mortgage indebtedness’ at a time when as many as half of all
378
home loans in the country were in default.” Thus, Congress enacted the HOLA to “provide[] for the creation of a system of federal sav-

371

372
373
374

375
376

377
378

12 U.S.C. § 1465(a) (“Any determination by a court or by the Director [of the Office of
Thrift Supervision] or any successor officer or agency regarding the relation of a State law
to a provision of this chapter or any regulation or order prescribed under this chapter
shall be made in accordance with the laws and legal standards applicable to national
banks regarding the preemption of State law.”).
Id. §§ 1461–1470.
Id. § 1465(b).
Id. § 25b(b) (noting that “in accordance with the legal standard for preemption in the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Barnett Bank of Marion County,” a
State consumer financial law is preempted if “the State consumer financial law prevents
or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers”); see supra
notes 371, 373 and accompanying text.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 25b(b)(2), (e), (h)(2), 1465(a); 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4010(a), 34.6 (2011).
Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,556 n.48 (noting that a conflict preemption standard “is in contrast to the [Office of Thrift Supervision’s] preemption rules,
which assert an ‘occupation of the field’ preemption standard for Federal savings associations”).
See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a).
Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 159 (1982) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 210, at 1 (1933) (Conf. Rep.)).
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ings and loan associations . . . ‘to promote the thrift of the peo379
ple . . . to finance their homes and the homes of their neighbors.’”
Therefore, the policy underlying the field preemption doctrine
for federal savings associations was to protect the powers of federal
savings associations in providing credit for individuals to purchase a
380
home.
In contrast, national banks did not share this same fundamental purpose to promote home ownership, and thus did not benefit from field preemption of state laws. Rather, the courts historically
have relegated national banks to the higher standard of conflict
381
preemption. While a field preemption standard was not universally
382
applied by the courts, the benefits of a field preemption standard
for federal savings associations in certain jurisdictions should not be
underestimated. For example, in the Ninth Circuit, the courts have
consistently held that federal law occupied the field with respect to
383
federal thrifts.
Thus, many California state laws were preempted
379
380

381

382

383

Id. at 160 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91, at 2 (1933)).
12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (specifying that thrift institutions are created “for the deposit of
funds and for the extension of credit for homes and other goods and services . . . . The
lending and investment powers conferred . . . are intended to encourage such institutions
to provide credit for housing safely and soundly”); California v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (finding one of the purposes for the creation
of federal savings and loan associations is to provide financing for home ownership).
See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); see also Franklin Nat’l Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375–79 (1954) (holding that
a federal statute permitting national banks to accept savings deposits preempts a conflicting state statute prohibiting the use of the word “savings” in the advertising of certain
state and national banks); First Nat’l Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U.S. 366, 368–69
(1923) (finding that national banks’ “power” to receive deposits preempts contrary state
escheat law).
Some courts did apply a conflict preemption standard for federal savings and loan associations. See, e.g., de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 159, 170 (implicitly acknowledging the doctrine
of field preemption for federal thrifts while still applying a conflict preemption standard
in holding that a federal regulation permitting federal savings and loan associations to
enforce due-on-sale clauses preempted a conflicting state law). Thus, the impact of a
conflict preemption standard on federal thrifts may not be significant in certain areas,
such as the law regarding due-on-sale clauses.
See, e.g., Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir.
1974) (“[F]ederal law preempts the field of prepayments of real estate loans to federally
chartered savings and loan associations, so that any California law in the area is inapplicable to federal savings and loan associations operating within California.”); Glendale
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 911 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (“The Ninth Circuit
has taken the position that Congress, in the HOLA, delegated to the [Federal Home
Loan] Bank Board the authority to regulate the operations of federal savings and loan associations to the exclusion of state regulation.”); Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp.
at 318 (“[T]he [Home Owners’ Loan] [A]ct . . . which authorized the creation, operation and supervision of federal savings and loan associations . . . embrace[s] the entire
field . . . . It seems clear that Congress has preempted the field, making invalid the state
statutes plaintiffs rely upon . . . when attempted to be invoked against a Federal savings
and loan association.”).
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without the need to apply the more rigorous standard of conflict
preemption.
While the policy underlying a field preemption standard for federal thrifts, that of helping to provide home ownership to our nation’s citizens, has been a long-standing hallmark of our national pol384
icy, the use of a field preemption doctrine for federal thrifts in
order to further the national policy of home ownership was misguid385
ed. As now firmly established by the Dodd-Frank Act, federal thrifts
should be held to the same preemption standards as national banks.
There are three reasons for this conclusion.
First and foremost, the National Bank Act was passed with the underlying policy of creating a system of national banks authorized to
386
issue a uniform national currency.
A uniform national currency
387
would, in turn, facilitate interstate commerce. However, courts historically did not apply a preemption of the field standard for national
banks in order to further the national policy goal of facilitating inter388
state commerce. Even in modern times, where national banks facilitate interstate commerce through deposit services, trust and invest389
ment services, and commercial and consumer lending activities,
courts still do not apply a preemption of the field standard for na390
tional banks.

384
385
386

387

388
389

390

See supra notes 377–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 371–75 and accompanying text.
12 U.S.C. § 38 (2012) (“The Act entitled ‘An Act to provide a national currency . . . and
to provide for the circulation and redemption thereof,’ approved June 3, 1864, shall be
known as ‘The National Bank Act.’”); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 8–9; ROSS M.
ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER & BANK SUPERVISION: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 45
(1995 ed.).
See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 548 (1869) (finding that “Congress has
undertaken to supply a currency for the entire country” which may be used “in all the
transactions of commerce”).
See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U.S. 366, 368–69 (1923) (finding
that national banks’ “power” to receive deposits preempts contrary state escheat law).
MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW 27–28 (2d ed. 2005)
(“[C]ommercial banks [(i.e., national banks and state banks)] are authorized to offer the
full range of banking services, including demand accounts (i.e., checking accounts) for
business and personal use, savings and time deposits, investment and loan services, trust
department services, and the like.” (emphasis omitted)).
See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); see also Franklin Nat’l Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375–79 (1954) (holding that
a federal statute permitting national banks to accept savings deposits preempts a conflicting state statute prohibiting the use of the word “savings” in the advertising of certain
state and national banks).
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Second, similar to the HOLA for federal thrifts, the National Bank
391
Act covers nearly every aspect of a national bank’s existence.
Moreover, similar to the prior regulators of federal savings associations, the Comptroller of the Currency has broad authority granted
by the National Bank Act to regulate the operations of national
392
banks.
Yet, courts have not found that Congress, in the National
Bank Act, intended to preempt the entire field of law with respect to
393
national banks, nor have courts found that the Comptroller’s regu394
lations preempt the field regarding national banks.
Third, a consistent preemption standard for both national banks
and federal savings associations is certainly warranted given the simi395
larities in services provided by both types of depository institutions.
For example, a large proportion of home mortgages are now under396
written by national banks. Thus, for all these reasons, preemption
law with respect to federal thrifts should be guided by the same
standard that applies to national banks: a conflict preemption standard.
The following Part will address the argument that federal preemption resulted in the subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis.

391

392

393

394
395

396

See 12 U.S.C. §§ 21–216 (2012); Bank of Am. v. City of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th Cir.
2002) (“[S]ince the passage of the National Bank Act in 1864, the federal presence in
banking has been significant.” (citing Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 32–33)).
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1–216; CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 61 (“[T]he Comptroller operates
with broad autonomy reinforced by statute.”); MALLOY, supra note 389, at 40 (“Approval
by the Comptroller is required for virtually all significant actions to be taken by a national
bank – chartering, establishment of branches, changes in corporate control and structure
of organization – and the [Comptroller] also supervises the day-to-day activities of national banks, including the loan and investment policies of the banks, trust activities, issuance
of securities and the like.”); ROBERTSON, supra note 386, at 1.
Idaho Dep’t of Fin. v. Sec. Pac. Bank Idaho, N.A. 800 F. Supp. 922, 925 (D. Idaho 1992)
(“It is clear that Congress has not completely preempted the entire banking field either
expressly or impliedly, so any preemption must arise out of an actual conflict between
federal and state law.”).
McCormick v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 3:08-0944, 2009 WL 151588, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Jan.
22, 2009) (“[T]here is . . . no field preemption of national bank regulation.”).
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 27–28 (“No longer do stark contrasts exist between
commercial banks and thrift institutions. Thrifts can make commercial and consumer
loans. They can offer credit cards, trust services, and personal and corporate checking accounts. . . . Banks and their affiliates, in turn, originate a large proportion of all home
mortgages.”).
Id. at 28.
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III. THE FALLACY THAT FEDERAL PREEMPTION CONTRIBUTED TO THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS
There are those who believe that federal preemption of state laws
397
According to
is “bad public policy” and should not be permitted.
this line of reasoning, federal preemption allowed predatory lending
to occur and ultimately resulted in the subprime mortgage crisis and
398
the financial crisis.
Predatory lending generally involves lending
terms and practices that are unfair, abusive, deceptive or fraudulent
to the borrower, and is generally associated with subprime mortgage
399
loans.
While not all subprime mortgage loans were predatory in
400
nature, subprime mortgage loans generally were granted to individuals “with impaired or limited credit histories, or high debt rela401
tive to their income.”
Not surprisingly, subprime mortgage loans
402
experienced high rates of default. According to a study by the Joint
Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, between 2003 and
2007, “[d]efaults on subprime loans within six to eighteen months of
403
origination . . . increased with each successive” year.
Many economists and experts in the field believe the subprime mortgage crisis
was caused by “the combination of a number of factors in which sub404
prime lending played a major part.”
Another type of nonprime loan that contributed to the financial
405
crisis is the Alt-A mortgage loan. Alt-A mortgages have better credit

397
398

399

400

401
402

403

404
405

Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,553.
Id.; see also Mason et al., supra note 11, at 790 (discussing arguments that blame federal
“preemption of state banking laws” for permitting “banks to originate predatory subprime . . . mortgages”); Spitzer, supra note 4, at A25 (arguing that the federal government
engaged in an “aggressive . . . campaign” aimed at preventing the states from protecting
consumers against predatory lending practices).
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & U.S. HOUSING & URBAN DEV., CURBING PREDATORY HOME
MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 1 (2000), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Documents/treasrpt.pdf (providing a general definition of
predatory lending).
See Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 7 (“[P]redatory lending is usually a
subset of subprime lending, but it is different from the type of subprime lending that was
lawful but involved exceptionally weak underwriting standards.”).
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., supra note 399, at 13.
See Bianco, supra note 341, at 6 (noting that “high default rates” were experienced on
subprime mortgage loans granted to “higher-risk borrowers with lower income or lesser
credit history than ‘prime’ borrowers”).
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S
HOUSING 20 (2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/
files/son2008.pdf.
Bianco, supra note 341, at 3.
See generally Prabha Natarajan, Toxic Debt Returns to Fashion, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2010, at
C6 (“Alt-A mortgages became infamous during the financial crisis for their inadequate or
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quality than subprime loans; however, these alternative mortgage
products have inferior credit quality when compared to prime
406
Alt-A mortgages were marketed to individuals with credit
loans.
scores that were better than those of subprime borrowers; however,
these alternative mortgage products required “little or no verification
407
of income.” In addition, Alt-A mortgages generally included higher
loan amounts relative to the value of the home, and higher debt rela408
tive to the borrower’s income, than prime loans.
Similar to subprime mortgage loans, Alt-A mortgages experienced high rates of de409
fault.
Keeping in mind the issues associated with nonprime mortgage
loans, this Part will address the argument that federal preemption resulted in the subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis and reveal the fallacy of this premise. Based on independent data and an
analysis of the preemption doctrine, this Part will demonstrate that
federal preemption did not contribute to the crises.
Before addressing these matters, it is important to understand the
complex structure of the regulatory environment for different lending institutions. This Part will first discuss the federal bank and thrift
regulatory agencies and the financial institutions regulated by each
agency.
A. The Federal Regulatory Agencies and the Institutions they Regulate
The federal bank and thrift regulatory agencies have evolved over
the long history of banking. The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the first banking regulator, was established under the National Currency Act of 1863, now known as the National Bank Act of
410
411
1864, as the regulator of national banks.
The Comptroller’s au-

406

407
408

409
410
411

inaccurate documentation; many failed quickly because home buyers couldn’t afford to
make the monthly payments.”).
See Patrick Bajari et al., A Dynamic Model of Subprime Mortgage Default: Estimation and
Policy Implication 4 n.3 (Nov. 23, 2011) (unpublished paper), available at
http://are.berkeley.edu/documents/seminar/2011Nov23MortgageDynamic.pdf.
Chris Isidore, ‘Liar loans’: Mortgage Woes Beyond Subprime, CNN MONEY (Mar. 19, 2007, 5:01
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/19/news/economy/next_subprime/index.htm.
See Bianco, supra note 341, at 6 (stating that mortgage loans classified as Alt-A exhibit an
increased risk profile because these loans generally have “higher loan-to-value and debtto-income ratios” compared to prime mortgages).
Id.
12 U.S.C. §§ 1–216 (2012).
Id.; see CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 61 (“The Comptroller of the Currency . . . regulates . . . national banks”); MALLOY, supra note 389, at 19 (“Approval by the
Comptroller is required for virtually all significant actions to be taken by a national bank–
chartering, establishment of branches, changes in corporate control and structure of or-
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thority also extends to subsidiaries of national banks.
Under the
Dodd-Frank Act, Congress granted the Comptroller the additional
413
authority to regulate federal savings associations. Previously, feder414
al savings associations were regulated by the OTS.
However, the
Dodd-Frank Act abolished the OTS and transferred the powers and
responsibilities of the OTS to the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve (“Federal Reserve Board”), as fur415
ther delineated in this Subpart.
The Federal Reserve System was established in 1913 under the
416
Federal Reserve Act.
The Federal Reserve Board and the Federal
Reserve banks (collectively, the “Federal Reserve”) are responsible for
regulating bank holding companies and state-chartered banks that
417
are members of the Federal Reserve System.
The Federal Reserve
shares the supervision of state-chartered member banks with the re418
spective states in which those banks are chartered. The Federal Reserve also has limited responsibility for regulating nonbank affiliates
of member banks, including nonbank affiliates of national banks and
419
nonbank affiliates of state member banks.
The Federal Reserve
420
shares the supervision of these nonbank affiliates with the states.
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress granted the Federal Reserve
Board the additional authority to regulate savings and loan holding

412
413
414

415
416
417
418
419

420

ganization–and the [Comptroller] also supervises the day-to-day activities of national
banks, including the loan and investment policies of the banks, trust activities, issuance of
securities and the like.”); ROBERTSON, supra note 386, at 44–45, 81.
See generally 12 U.S.C. § 24a; MALLOY, supra note 389, at 40.
See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5412.
The OTS previously regulated federally chartered savings associations, state-chartered
savings associations, and savings and loan holding companies. See id. § 5412(b). The
OTS shared supervision of the state-chartered savings associations with the respective
states in which those institutions were chartered. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 63.
Prior to the OTS, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board was the regulator of federal and
state thrifts and thrift holding companies. MALLOY, supra note 389, at 51.
The Dodd-Frank Act abolished the OTS and transferred its responsibilities to the other
bank regulatory agencies effective July 21, 2011. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5411–5413.
Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–
505); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 13; MALLOY, supra note 389, at 47.
12 U.S.C. §§ 321, 325, 1844; CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 62; MALLOY, supra note 389,
at 47.
12 U.S.C. § 326; CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 63; MALLOY, supra note 389, at 40.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 334, 338, 1828a(b) (noting that in connection with the examination of
state member banks, the Federal Reserve may examine the affiliates of the state member
banks to determine “the relations between [the state member banks] and their affiliates
and the effect of such relations on the affairs of” the state member banks).
Id. § 1846(a).
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421

companies.
Previously, these institutions were regulated by the
422
Also under the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal Reserve Board
OTS.
now has examination authority with respect to a designated nonbank
423
financial company and any of its subsidiaries.
424
The FDIC was established under the Banking Act of 1933. The
FDIC regulates state-chartered banks that are not members of the
425
Federal Reserve System. These state-chartered non-member banks
are supervised by both the FDIC and the respective states in which
426
the bank is chartered. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress granted the FDIC the additional authority to regulate state-chartered sav427
ings associations.
Previously, the OTS was the federal regulator of
428
these institutions.
With the abrogation of the OTS and the transferring of regulatory
authority for federal savings associations to the Comptroller of the
429
Currency, the Dodd-Frank Act streamlined the bank and thrift regulatory environment. The Comptroller now regulates both national
430
banks and federal thrifts.
However, state-chartered banks and
thrifts continue to be subject to supervision by both a federal banking
agency (the FDIC or the Federal Reserve) and the state in which the
431
institution is chartered.

421
422
423

424
425

426
427
428
429
430
431

Id. § 5412.
See generally id. § 5412(b).
A nonbank financial company is a company that is “predominantly engaged” in financial
activities. Id. § 5311(a)(4). A company will be designated as a nonbank financial company subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve Board based on whether “material financial distress” at the company “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United
States.” Id. §§ 5323(a)(1), (b)(1).
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 18.
12 U.S.C. § 1820(b); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 62. The FDIC also has the authority to examine any insured depository institution if the FDIC determines that such examination is necessary for deposit insurance purposes (so-called back-up examination authority). In addition, if the primary federal regulator of an insured depository institution
fails to carry out necessary enforcement action, the FDIC has the power to take enforcement action (so-called back-up enforcement authority). Id.; 12 U.S.C. § 1818(t). Additionally, under the Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC’s back-up examination authority was expanded to cover nonbank financial companies supervised by the Federal Reserve Board
and bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in assets. Id. §§ 1820(b), 5365(a).
The Dodd-Frank Act also expanded the FDIC’s back-up enforcement authority to cover
any depository institution holding company. Id. § 1818(t).
Id. § 1820(h).
Id. § 5412.
Id. § 5412(b).
See supra notes 413–15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 411–13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 417–18, 425–27 and accompanying text.
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As discussed in Parts I and II, federal preemption applies to national banks and federal savings associations. The next Subpart will
focus on the lending institutions for which federal preemption does
not apply.
B. Preemption Does Not Apply to State-Regulated Lending Institutions
In examining whether federal preemption contributed to the
subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis, it is important to
distinguish between financial institutions subject to federal preemption and those not subject to federal preemption. Federal preemp432
tion applies to national banks and federal thrifts.
These banking
433
institutions are regulated primarily by a federal banking agency.
However, federal preemption does not apply to lending institutions
434
regulated by the states. These state-regulated mortgage underwriters include state-chartered banks and thrifts, nonbank affiliates of na435
tional banks and federal thrifts under a holding company, and independent mortgage companies that are not affiliated with a bank or
436
thrift.
Therefore, prior to and during the financial crisis, states
were free to enact and enforce mortgage lending laws with respect to
these state-regulated lending institutions without the threat or impo437
sition of federal preemption.
However, despite the states’ power to regulate and enforce mortgage lending laws unimpeded by federal preemption, the “vast majority” of nonprime loans, including subprime mortgages and Alt-A
438
mortgages, were originated by state-regulated lending institutions.
432
433
434
435

436

437
438

See supra Parts I, II.A, II.E.
As provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, national banks and federal thrifts are both regulated
by the Comptroller of the Currency. See supra notes 411–13 and accompanying text.
Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 5.
Nonbank affiliates of national banks and federal thrifts under a holding company should
be clearly distinguished from operating subsidiaries of national banks and federal thrifts.
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, operating subsidiaries of national banks and federal thrifts
received the same preemption of state laws that the parent national bank or federal thrift
received. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 550 U.S. 1, 7 (2007); 12 C.F.R. §559.3(n)
(2003) (noting that state law applies to an operating subsidiary of a federal thrift only to
the same extent that it applies to the parent federal thrift). In stark contrast, federal
preemption did not apply to the affiliates of national banks and federal thrifts under a
holding company. See generally Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 6–7. These nonbank affiliates share the same parent holding company with the particular national
bank or federal thrift. See id. at 5, chart 1.
See Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 5. This Article will define “independent mortgage companies” as entities that are not affiliated with a bank or thrift and are in
the business of providing residential mortgage loans to consumers.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 8.
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Independent data indicates that during the peak of the mortgage crisis from 2005 to 2007, seventy-two percent of the nonprime loans, including nearly seventy-eight percent of the subprime loans, were orig439
inated by lending institutions subject to state jurisdiction.
Thus,
federal preemption did not apply with respect to nearly threequarters of the nonprime loans, including nearly eighty percent of
440
the subprime mortgages.
Moreover, independent mortgage companies, alone, were responsible for originating more than half of the
nonprime loans, including nearly sixty-four percent of the subprime
441
loans.
These independent mortgage companies were regulated
solely by the states in which the companies were operating and did
442
not benefit from federal preemption. In contrast, during the same
time period, national banks and their subsidiaries accounted for only
443
twelve percent of the nonprime loans.
A study of data associated with loans made under guidelines established by the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) reveals that “only six percent of all the higher-priced loans” made to “lower income
borrowers or neighborhoods” were extended by lenders covered by
444
445
the CRA.
The CRA covers insured depository institutions.
The
Act does not cover independent mortgage companies or nonbank affiliates of national banks and federal thrifts under a holding company. Thus, these state-regulated lenders, for which preemption does

439

440
441

442
443

444

445

Id. at 8, app. B at 3–4 (acknowledging that data is derived from Loan Performance Corp.,
now owned by First American CoreLogic, Inc.); id. app. B at 4 n.2 (“The [72 percent and
78 percent] figure[s] understate[] the actual extent of state authority, because loans
made by affiliates of federal thrifts are [not included in these percentages] but actually
are subject to state authority.”).
See id. at 8; see also id. app. B at 4.
See id. app. B at 2, 4 (“Lenders supervised only by the states originated 63.6 percent of
subprime loans during these years, and 57.1 percent of combined nonprime
[loans] . . . .”); see also Mason et al., supra note 11, at 803–04 (“Our analysis indicates that
the vast majority of subprime loans were originated by lenders outside of the banking system’s regulatory apparatus.”).
Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 4 (“[M]ortgage lenders that are not affiliated with banks or thrifts are subject only to state supervision.”).
See id. app. B at 4 (explaining that, from 2005 to 2007, national banks and their subsidiaries originated 12.1% of the nonprime loans, including 10.6% of the subprime loans,
while federal thrifts and their subsidiaries originated 15.9% of the nonprime loans, including 11.5% of the subprime loans). But see id. app. B at 4 n.2 (noting that these figures are somewhat overstated because loans made by affiliates of federal thrifts are included in the percentages for federal thrifts).
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 69 (2009) (“[T]he worst abuses
were made by firms not covered by [the] CRA.”).
See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901(a), 2902(2) (2012).

Apr. 2014]

DEFENSE OF THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION

1099

not apply, were responsible for originating ninety-four percent of all
446
the higher-priced loans.
In examining the argument that federal preemption resulted in
the subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis, it is clear that
the argument is flawed. As the independent data demonstrates, the
“overwhelming majority” of subprime mortgages were originated by
state-regulated lending institutions for which federal preemption did
447
not apply.
In particular, independent mortgage companies, those
lending institutions regulated solely by the states, accounted for more
448
than half of the subprime mortgage originations. As stated by Barney Frank, former Chairman of the House Committee on Financial
Services and co-sponsor of the Dodd-Frank Act, the subprime mortgage crisis was caused not by the regulated banks, but instead “[by]
449
In disloans being made outside of the regular banking system.”
cussing the “role of regulation,” Representative Frank observed that
“[r]easonable regulation of mortgages by the bank . . . regulators allowed the market to function in an efficient and constructive way,
while mortgages made and sold in the unregulated sector led to the
450
crisis.” Even state attorneys general have found that “[a]lmost all of
the leading subprime lenders [were] mortgage companies and fi451
For exnance companies, not banks or direct bank subsidiaries.”
ample, one particularly notorious independent mortgage company
held a significant share of the subprime mortgage market. According
to the Washington State Department of Financial Institutions,
“Ameriquest Mortgage Company was the largest privately held retail
446
447

448
449

450

451

Mason et al., supra note 11, at 782, 791.
Id. at 782; see also id. at 787–88 (“The overwhelming majority of instances of predatory
lending involved loans originated by institutions not subject to preemption, but instead
under the purview of state laws.”).
See supra notes 441–42 and accompanying text.
Representative Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee,
Speech at National Press Club: The “Loan Arrangers” Will Not Ride Again (July 27,
2009), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-barney-frank/the-loan-arrangerswill-n_b_247264.html.
Barney Frank, Op-Ed., Lessons of the Subprime Crisis, BOSTON GLOBE, July 14, 2007,
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/09/14/less
ons_of_the_subprime_crisis.
Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, Federal Preemption and Federal Banking Agency Responses to Predatory Lending, 59 BUS. LAW. 1193 n.29 (2004) (“Based on consumer complaints received, as well as investigations and enforcement actions undertaken by the Attorneys General, predatory lending abuses are largely confined to the subprime mortgage
lending market and to non-depository institutions.” (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae State
Attorneys Gen. in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Nat’l Home Equity Mortgage Ass’n
v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 271 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. CIV.A.022506(GK)), 2003 WL 24210106, at *8)).
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mortgage lender in America and the largest subprime lender by vol452
ume.”
Moreover, evidence indicates that state-regulated subprime lenders, in particular, independent mortgage companies regulated solely
453
by the states, engaged in abusive lending practices.
For example,
despite the ability of the states to regulate and enforce state lending
laws unhampered by federal preemption, Ameriquest was permitted
to engage in “unlawful mortgage lending practices from January 1,
1999 through December 31, 2005” before entering into a multistate
454
settlement agreement with forty-nine states in January 2006.
Ameriquest could have applied for a charter to become a national
bank or a federal thrift and, thus, receive the benefit of federal
preemption for its multistate mortgage lending operations. Yet,
Ameriquest chose to remain an independent mortgage company
regulated by the states. Clearly, Ameriquest did not view federal
preemption as a means of avoiding compliance with state law nor was
preemption involved in any way in the predatory lending activities of
this state-regulated mortgage company.
Perhaps even more revealing is the fact that a number of large
bank holding companies chose to establish their subprime mortgage
lending operations in the affiliate of the national bank (for which
preemption did not apply) rather than in the national bank (for
455
which preemption did apply).
One could query why these bank
holding companies chose to place their subprime mortgage lending
operations in an entity that did not benefit from federal preemption.
Perhaps the level of regulation differed, making state-regulated
mortgage lending institutions more attractive to the subprime mortgage market. Whatever the reason, it is clear that bank holding companies were not relying on federal preemption to shield their subprime mortgage lending institutions from state law. Instead, state
laws, including any laws the states chose to enact with respect to regu-

452
453

454
455

Ameriquest Settlement Facts, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., http://www.dfi.wa.gov/
cs/ameriquest_facts.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., supra note 399, at 13
(“[A]n unscrupulous subset of these subprime . . . lenders (often those not subject to
federal banking supervision) . . . engage[d] in abusive lending practices that strip[ped]
borrowers’ home equity and place[d] them at increased risk of foreclosure.”).
AMERIQUEST
MULTISTATE
SETTLEMENT
(Mar.
29,
2013),
http://ameriquestmultistatesettlement.com.
Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 6–7; see also id. at 7 (“For example, HSBC,
Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and Countrywide (when it owned a national bank) conducted
most of their subprime mortgage lending in holding company affiliates of national banks
that were . . . subject to . . . state supervision.”).
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lation, supervision, and enforcement, were fully applicable to these
456
state-regulated affiliates of national banks.
Moreover, the power of states to regulate the affiliates of national
banks under a holding company has been made explicit by Con457
gress. The Bank Holding Company Act “expressly empowers states
458
to regulate bank holding companies and their subsidiaries.” Thus,
states have the statutory authority, granted by Congress, to regulate
the affiliates of national banks under a bank holding company. In
contrast, the Savings and Loan Holding Company Act is silent regarding the power of states to regulate savings and loan holding compa459
nies and their subsidiaries. However, the Second Circuit has interpreted “Congress’s silence . . . as implicit approval of state
460
regulation.”
Thus, states also have the authority to regulate affiliates of federal thrifts under a holding company.
Additionally, independent data indicates that, between 2000 and
2009, approximately 240 federally regulated banks converted from a
461
federal charter to a state charter.
Of this amount, roughly twelve
percent converted to a state charter to avoid federal regulatory ac462
tions. According to another study, between 2000 and 2011, almost
300 national banks converted to a state charter while only ninety-two
463
state-chartered banks converted to a nationally chartered bank.
The apparent reason for the conversions from a national charter to a
state charter was the “pursuit of leniency” a state regulator would be
464
expected to provide in comparison to a federal regulator.
Thus,
many federally chartered banks converted to state-regulated institu-
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458
459
460

461
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464

Id. at 6 (“[T]he overwhelming majority of subprime lending was done outside of national
banks in entities that were subject to state law . . . .”).
See 12 U.S.C. § 1846(a) (2012) (“No provision of this chapter shall be construed as preventing any State from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may
hereafter have with respect to companies, banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries thereof.”).
Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Brown, 806 F.2d 399, 410 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1846).
See id. (“[T]he [Savings and Loan Holding Company Act] does not expressly allow regulation of S&L holding companies by states . . . .”).
Id. (basing its interpretation upon Congress’s indication that “it was aware at the time of
the [Savings and Loan Holding Company Act’s] passage that states already regulated savings and loan holding companies and their subsidiaries”).
Binyamin Appelbaum, By Switching Their Charters, Banks Skirt Supervision, WASH. POST, Jan.
22, 2009, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-01-22/business/36867887_1_national
-charters-regulators-state-charters.
Id.
Barbara A. Rehm, Two-Decade Trend Squeezes Choice from Dual Banking System, AM. BANKER
(Oct. 26, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_208/nationalbanks-community-policymakers-charter-1043546-1.html.
See Appelbaum, supra note 461.
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tions in an effort to avoid federal regulation, notwithstanding the
state lending laws that would be fully applicable to these newly con465
verted state banks. Evidently, these banks were not relying on federal preemption to avoid compliance with state law.
As demonstrated, the doctrine of federal “preemption did not and
466
does not prevent regulation” of independent mortgage companies.
Nor does federal preemption prevent regulation of other stateregulated lending institutions, including affiliates of national banks
and federal thrifts under a holding company and state-chartered
467
banks and thrifts.
Nevertheless, nearly three-quarters of the
nonprime loans, including nearly eighty percent of the subprime
loans, were originated by state-regulated lending institutions for
468
which federal preemption did not apply.
State-regulated lenders
also were responsible for originating ninety-four percent of all the
469
Moreover, state-regulated subprime lenders
higher-priced loans.
engaged in abusive and unlawful lending practices, despite the unhampered ability of the states to regulate and enforce state anti470
predatory lending laws against these lenders.
The supposed link between federal preemption and the subprime
mortgage crisis is even more tenuous when one considers the choice
of bank holding companies to place their mortgage lending business
in the affiliate of the national bank rather than in the national
471
bank, knowing federal preemption would not apply to the affiliate
of the national bank. Clearly, bank holding companies were not relying on federal preemption to shield their mortgage lending subsidiaries from state laws. Rather, state laws were fully applicable to these
472
state-regulated mortgage lenders.
The argument against federal
preemption is further weakened by the choice of nationally chartered
banks to convert to state charters despite the applicability of state
473
lending laws to state-regulated institutions.
Similar to the bank
holding companies, these banks were not depending upon federal

465
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467
468
469
470
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473

See supra notes 434–35 and accompanying text.
Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,554.
See supra notes 434–37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 439–40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 444–46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 434–37, 453–54 and accompanying text.
Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 6–7 (“[S]everal large bank holding companies conducted all or most of their subprime mortgage lending in nonbank subsidiaries rather than their national bank subsidiaries.”).
Id. at 6.
See supra notes 461–65 and accompanying text.

Apr. 2014]

DEFENSE OF THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION

1103

preemption to protect their mortgage lending activities from state
laws.
Even granting that national banks and federal thrifts engaged in
474
nonprime lending, albeit to a minimal extent, this fact does not
support the argument that federal preemption led to the subprime
mortgage crisis and the financial crisis. Obviously, state lending laws
did not prohibit nonprime mortgage lending, in and of itself, as evidenced by the significant percentage of subprime loans and Alt-A
475
Thus, the
loans originated by state-regulated mortgage lenders.
origination of nonprime loans by national banks and federal thrifts
does not implicate federal preemption as a contributing cause of the
subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis. There is no nexus
between federal preemption and the subprime mortgage crisis.
As an illustration, suppose the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (“FEMA”) is responsible for dam safety on waterways used for
interstate commerce, and New York State is responsible for dam safety on reservoirs in the state used for drinking water. There are ten
dams located in the state. Two of the dams are regulated by FEMA
and the other eight dams are regulated by the state. The FEMA regulated dams benefit from federal preemption of state laws. The other
eight dams are fully subject to state laws. The state experiences a severe storm and a hundred-year flood. All ten dams suffer breaches
during the flood which cause massive property damage downstream.
Would it be reasonable to blame the property damage on the
preemption of state laws? I would argue that federal preemption did
not contribute to the damage. Had the two FEMA-regulated dams
been subject to state laws, the result would have been the same. The
storm still would have occurred, the dams still would have been
breached, and the massive property damage still would have been suffered.
Likewise, the argument that federal preemption is to blame for
the financial crisis is a fallacy. Federal preemption did not lead to the
subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis, nor did federal
preemption contribute to the crises.
The next Part will discuss the supposed benefits of eliminating
federal preemption versus the costs.

474
475

See supra note 443 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 439–41 and accompanying text.
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IV. BENEFITS VERSUS COSTS OF ELIMINATING FEDERAL PREEMPTION
As discussed in Part II.A.1, the meaning of the preemption provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act was debated in a number of letters
476
among the executive and legislative branches of the government.
In response to a letter by the Treasury Department to the Comptroller of the Currency, Senators Carper and Warner indicated that although the Administration supported the elimination of federal
477
preemption, Congress “rejected” that position. While the Treasury
Department, in its letter to the Comptroller, did not explicitly advocate elimination of federal preemption, the Treasury argued for a
478
narrowing of the preemption standard. Thus, fewer state consumer
financial laws would be preempted under the Treasury’s interpretation.
While the elimination of federal preemption, or even a narrowing
of the preemption standard, may be considered a curiously Federalist
479
position for a Democratic administration, the overarching policy
behind the position is clearly to protect consumers by ensuring the
applicability of State consumer financial laws to national banks. This
480
position is consistent with a liberal viewpoint.
While protecting
consumers is certainly a worthy public policy goal shared by the author of this Article, this goal would not be furthered by the elimination of federal preemption. As discussed in Part III.B, national banks
and federal thrifts, those banking institutions for which federal
preemption applies, were not responsible for originating the vast majority of nonprime mortgages, including subprime mortgages and Alt481
A mortgages.
Rather, state-regulated lenders were responsible for
482
Moreover,
underwriting the bulk of these nonprime mortgages.
state-regulated lenders, in particular, independent mortgage compa476
477

478

479

480
481
482

See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
Letter from Carper and Warner, supra note 120, at 1 (“While we understand that the position of the Administration was to eliminate federal preemption for national banks, the
fact is that Congress did not accept that position.”).
See Comment Letter from George W. Madison, supra note 125, at 1–2 (“We believe
that . . . Congress intended that a state consumer financial law may be preempted only if
the law ‘prevents or significantly interferes’ with the exercise of a national bank’s powers . . . .”).
See, e.g., Gregory M. Dickinson, An Empirical Study of Obstacle Preemption in the Supreme
Court, 89 NEB. L. REV. 682 (2011) (“Preemption defies traditional conservative—liberal
alignment, as conservatives are torn between support of federalism and capitalist efficiency, and liberals are torn between support of strong national governance and multiplicity
of legal remedies.”).
See id. at 685–86.
See supra note 443 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 438–41 and accompanying text.
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483

nies, engaged in predatory lending practices. Federal preemption
484
Thus,
did not apply to these state-regulated lending institutions.
the supposed benefit of eliminating federal preemption—the protection of consumers through the enhanced applicability of State consumer financial laws—is simply a fallacy.
At the same time, the costs of eliminating federal preemption
485
would be staggering to the banking industry.
These costs are not
only measured in dollars, but also in the public policy issues that
486
In setting forth the preemption provisions in the
would ensue.
Dodd-Frank Act, Congress desired to provide “certainty” to both consumers and the banking industry regarding the standard for preemp487
tion. This certainty would be greatly diminished if federal preemption was eliminated. For example, if federal preemption was
eliminated or narrowed within the Barnett standard, it would create
488
“great uncertainty” for the banking industry. National banks would
need to review each of the products and services offered on a nationwide basis to determine whether the bank was in compliance with
489
“hundreds of differing state and local laws.”
Undoubtedly, litigation would follow in an attempt to determine the parameters of the
new standard and whether national banks were in compliance with
490
that new standard in all fifty states. Moreover, complying with the
differing standards of individual states may “require a bank to determine which state’s law governs—the law of the state where a person
provides a product or service; the law of the home state of the bank;
491
or the law of the state where the customer is located.”
Any disa-

483
484
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See supra notes 453–54 and accompanying text.
Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 5.
See, e.g., Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View From the Trenches, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 1257, 1262 (2010) (“Th[e] multiplicity of government actors below the federal level
virtually ensures that, in the absence of federal preemption, businesses with national operations that serve national markets will be subject to complicated, overlapping, and
sometimes even conflicting legal regimes. These overlapping regulations have the potential to impose onerous burdens on interstate commerce and to disrupt and undermine
federal regulatory programs.”).
Letter from Carper & Warner, supra note 120, at 3.
156 CONG. REC. S5889 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Johnson).
Letter from Carper & Warner, supra note 120, at 3.
Id.
See id. (“There can be no doubt this would lead to years of litigation before the new
standard was finalized in a way that enabled national banks (and state banks chartered by
states with wild card statutes) to plan and deliver products and services without significant
legal risk.”).
John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks before Women in Housing and
Finance: The Need to Preserve Uniform National Standards for National Banks 7–8
(Sept. 24, 2009).
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greement with the bank’s determination would most likely result in
492
“litigation in multiple jurisdictions.”
Ultimately, the uncertainty that would ensue as a result of the
elimination or even the narrowing of the Barnett standard would
493
cause banks to incur significant costs.
Specifically, banks would
need to review the state and local laws in all fifty states to determine
compliance, adjust product development and the provision of services wherever necessary in the particular jurisdictions, and continually monitor the differing state and local laws to maintain compli494
ance.
These “disparate standards would impose significant
495
compliance costs on banks seeking to operate across state lines.”
Even Senator Elizabeth Warren, a well-known consumer protection
advocate, has acknowledged that “[i]n an era of interstate banking,
uniform regulation of consumer credit products at the federal level
may well be more efficient than a litany of consumer protection rules
496
that vary from state to state.”
As a result of the increased cost of compliance, “some portion of
497
These costs,
these costs” will likely be passed along to consumers.
along with the inevitable litigation costs, will likely reduce the availa498
bility of banking products and services. At a time when the economy depends on the ability of the banking industry to lend to consumers in need of credit, an increase in costs to banks and a resulting
decrease in banking services could have a devastating effect on the
499
economy.
Such an effect is entirely unnecessary, especially when
the benefits of eliminating federal preemption are not readily apparent. Accordingly, this analysis leads to the conclusion that the costs
of eliminating federal preemption would far outweigh the supposed
benefits.
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Id. at 8.
Letter from Carper and Warner, supra note 120, at 3.
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING A SYSTEM OF NATIONAL
STANDARDS FOR NATIONAL BANKS 15 (2010), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/
speeches/2009/pub-speech-2009-112.pdf; see also Mason et al., supra note 11, at 802
(“Eliminating preemption would create a complex regulatory environment where banks
are forced to operate under a patchwork of state regulations.”).
Mason et al., supra note 11, at 802.
Elizabeth Warren & Oren Bar-Gill, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 83 (2008).
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 494, at 15.
See Letter from Carper & Warner, supra note 120, at 3.
See id. (“This uncertainty would clearly increase the cost and decrease the availability of
bank services, including lending, at a time of economic difficulty when we can least afford
it.”).
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to explore the doctrine of preemption in the context of banking and to provide a critical examination
of the preemption reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act. While this Article
analyzes the impact of these changes on the doctrine of preemption,
the ultimate effect of many of the reform provisions is yet to be seen.
Notably, although many aspects of the preemption doctrine were altered by the statute, the preemption standard remains unchanged.
This Article also addresses the fallacy that federal preemption of
state laws resulted in the subprime mortgage crisis and the financial
crisis. Based on independent data and an analysis of the preemption
doctrine, this Article argues that federal preemption did not contribute to the crises. Finally, this Article examines the costs of eliminating federal preemption and requiring national banks and federal
thrifts to adhere to the differing laws of fifty states. Based on this
analysis, it is clear that the costs of eliminating federal preemption far
outweigh the ostensible benefits.
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